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INTRODUCTION 
THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA'S 
NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAMME 
The issue of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's (DPRK?) nuclear energy 
programme has attracted much international attention. The concern has revolved around the 
potential for the DPRK to use this nuclear energy programme for military purposes; in other 
words, the issue is whether or not the DPRK has any ambitions to acquire nuclear weapons. 
International concern has been motivated by the DPRK's refusal to sign the Safeguards 
Agreement, despite having signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NNPT). 
It is worth remembering that both Koreas, the DPRK and the Republic of Korea 
(ROK2) , are technically still at war with each other;3 in this context, the nuclearization of 
Korea is potentially a most destabilizing development. But this may already be a foregone 
conclusion.4 The ROK, long suspected of having nuclear ambitions, has a substantial 
nuclear energy programme under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) guidelines 
which can quickly be transformed for military use. The DPRK is known to have two small 
experimental nuclear reactors supplied by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) 
1 The DPRK is also referred to as North Korea. 
2 The ROK is ruso referred to as South Korea. 
3 Frank Downs, "The Politics of Division", in Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter (hereafter 
APDR), July 1990, Vol.XVII, No.1, pp.15-16. 
4 Kihl Young Whan, "The Korean Peninsula Conflict: Equilibrium or Deescalation?" , 
in Lawrence Grinter and Kihl Young Whan(eds.), East Asian Conflict Zones: 
Prospects for Regional Stability and Deescalation (New York: St. Martin's Press, 
1987), pp.112-13. 
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under IAEA and NPT conditions5 ; a third plant at Yongbyon - the cause for concern - was 
detected in 1985. United States Forces in Korea (USFK) probably deploy tactical nuclear 
weapons as well. 6 During the Korean War, the USA apparently contemplated using nuclear 
weapons, although primarily against the USSR and the People's Republic of China (PRC).7 
It is unclear if the DPRK would want nuclear weapons in the first place. Gary 
Klintworth has suggested that the DPRK may not have any nuclear ambitions.8 Kim Jong 
II, the heir apparent to Kim II Sung9, has stated that the DPRK needs to concentrate on the 
problems of economic modernization. 1o Recently, Kim II Sung stated that the DPRK did 
not have any nuclear ambitions. 11 In a letter to the United Nations Security Council 
(UNSC) in November 1990, the DPRK reiterated its aim of making the Korean peninSUla a 
5 "Major Expansion of Yongbyon Nuclear Plant Reported by Kyodo, Yonhap", in 
Summary of World BroadcastslFar Eastl0685 (hereafter SWBIFE) , 10 Feb 1990. The 
USSR supplied two small reactors under the express conditions that these reactors are 
specifically for peaceful purposes. A discussion of Soviet policy regarding nuclear 
aid to other countries will be presented later in this chapter. 
6 Vladimir 1. Ivanov, "Soviet View of the Military Confrontation in the Western 
Pacific", in The Korean Journal of International Studies, Spring 1990, Vol.XXI, 
No.1, pp.59-60. 
7 Roger Dingman, "Atomic Diplomacy During the Korean War", in International 
Security, Winter 1988, Vol.13, No.3, pp.50-91; and Rosemary J. Foot, "Nuclear 
Coercion and the Ending of the Korean Conflict", in International Security, Winter 
1988, Vol. 13, No.3, pp.92-112. 
8 Gary Klintworth, "The Yin and Tang of Pyongyang Diplomacy", in The Australian, 
18 May 1990. 
9 The name of the DPRK President has also been spelt Kim II-sung, Kim II-song and 
Kim II Song by various scholars. In this study, the name will be spelt Kim II Sung. 
It should be noted that in Korean culture, the family name precedes the individual's 
name. This practice will be followed in this study. 
10 "Let Us Continue to Vigorously Launch the 3 August Campaign for Production of 
People's Consumer Goods", in Foreign Broadcast Information Service-East Asia-90-
153 (hereafter FBIS-EAS) , 8 Aug 1990. 
11 "Kim Denies Nuclear Capability", in FBIS-EAS-90-188, 27 Sept 1990. 
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nuclear weapons-free zone (NWFZ).12 The DPRK has repeatedly called for the withdrawal 
of USFK nuclear weapons from the ROK. The DPRK recently appeared to grant two 
concessions to the ROK on this issue: it now agrees with the ROK's call for a nuclear, 
biological and chemical (NBC) weapons-free zone in Korea;13 the DPRK also allegedly 
agreed to allow inspection of its nuclear facilities once USFK nuclear weapons are totally 
withdrawn. 14 However, until such inspection is actually carried out, it is likely that fears 
regarding the possibility of a nuclear-armed DPRK will continue to haunt policy-makers in 
the ROK. It is worth noting that the DPRK has since then denied that it would sign the 
Safeguards Agreement after US nuclear weapons are withdrawn from the ROK. 15 
The military doctrines of the Korean People's Army (KPA) , the DPRK's armed 
forces, also suggest that nuclear weapons have no place in KP A strategy. There appears to 
be two schools of thought on this issue: one school argues that the KP A's strategic and 
tactical doctrines are influenced by the Soviet Red Army, with the emphasis on maintaining 
the offensive; 16 the other argues that KP A strategy emphasizes guerilla action.17 Neither 
interpretation indicates that nuclear weapons would fit into the prevailing KP A strategy. 
The DPRK, along with the PRC, had criticized the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (TBT) 
12 Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of 
Korea, 16 November 1990. 
13 "North Korea eases stand on call for N-free zone", in Bangkok Post, 21 Nov 1991. 
14 See "North Korea ready for nuclear inspection", in The Nation, 23 Nov 1991. 
15 "N.Korea denies it will sign N-accord", in Bangkok Post, 26 Nov 1991. 
16 Marko Milivojevic, "The Korean People's Army", in Armed Forces, June 1987, 
Vo1.6, No.6, pp.261-2. Evidence of this is seen in the KPA's emphasis on tank and 
armoured forces. At the same time, the KP A lacks the kind of artillery that can fire 
nuclear artillery shells. 
17 "Article Examines KPA's Formation", in FBIS-EAS-90-149, 2 Aug 1990. 
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between the United States of America (USA) and the USSR as an attempt by the superpowers 
to establish a monopoly on nuclear weapons. IS However, the DPRK's objection was raised 
in support of the PRC in the context of the Sino-Soviet conflict. Recently, the DPRK 
threatened, both obliquely and openly, to acquire nuclear weapons. When Soviet-ROK 
diplomatic relations were being established, the DPRK threatened to "to provide ourselves 
some weapons for which we have so far relied upon the alliance. ,,19 The DPRK has also 
threatened to build nuclear weapons if USSR-ROK relations were to improve further. 20 In 
the past, in response to US pressure to sign the Safeguards Agreement, the DPRK stated that 
this was an issue stricti y between the IAEA and the D PRK. 21 At the start of 1991, the 
ROK Defense Minister warned that the DPRK will acquire nuclear weapons by 1995, as it 
is expected to secure a large amount of plutonium soon.22 
Obstacles to Proliferation 
However, the NPT and the Safeguards Agreement pose as serious obstacles facing any 
state with nuclear ambitions; states that have endorsed the NPT are bound to refrain from 
IS Ralph N. Clough Embattled Korea: The Rivalry for International Support (Boulder 
and London: Westview Press, 1978), p.248. 
19 "Soviet Diplomatic Moves with ROK Criticised", in FBIS-EAS-90-182 , 19 Sept 1990. 
According to Andrew Mack, these "weapons mentioned could only be nuclear 
weapons". See Andrew Mack, "North Korea and the Bomb", in Foreign Policy , 
Summer 1991, No.83, p.89. 
20 "N Korea 'will build nuclear weapons''', in Jane's Defence Weekly (hereafter JDW), 
12 Jan 1991. Also see "Moscow, Seoul links spur N.Korea threat" , in The 
Washington Times, 2 Jan 1991. 
21 "DPRK, U.S. Embassies Discuss Korea", in Foreign Broadcast Information Service-
China-90-007 (hereafter FBIS-CHl), 10 Jan 1990. 
22 "South Korean Defence Minister on threat from North", in S~/FE/0981 , 28 Jan 
1991. 
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aiding horizontal nuclear proliferation.23 The main obstacles to nuclear proliferation are the 
acquisition of nuclear weapons materials and the design and fabrication of explosives.24 As 
a signatory, the USSR is thus bound to the NPT. Gerald Segal has argued that both the 
USSR and the PRC have strong interests in the NPT and IAEA.25 However, neither France 
nor the PRC, existing nuclear powers, have signed the NPT. 
The USSR has been seen as an avid supporter of the NPT and the Safeguards 
Agreement. This was motivated by the ease in which the PRC "transformed Soviet nuclear 
aid into a weapons programme". 26 Present recipients of Soviet nuclear aid are subject to 
stringent conditions designed to prevent further horizontal nuclear proliferation. 27 In terms 
of the Korean peninsula, the USSR has supported measures to lower military tensions; for 
, 
. instance, the USSR has supported calls for the establishment of a Korean NWFZ.28 
However, despite these obstacles, it may still be possible for the DPRK to acquire a 
simple nuclear device.29 The technical specifications for such ,a simple nuclear device are 
23 The Regulation of Nuclear Trade Vol. 1: International Aspects (hereafter Nuclear 
Trade) (France: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 1988), 
p.53. The term "horizontal nuclear proliferation" refers to the spread of nuclear 
weapons to previously non-nuclear states. 
24 Lewis A. Dunn, "Nuclear Nonproliferation: A Defense In-depth", in Jed C.Snyder 
and Samuel F. Wells(eds.), Limiting Nuclear Proliferation (Cambridge: 
Massachussetts: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1985), pp.283-99. 
25 Gerald Segal, Rethinking the Pacific (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), p.262. 
26 William C. Potter, "Soviet Nuclear Export Policy", in Limiting Nuclear Proliferation, 
pp.217-52. 
27 For instance, all recipients of Soviet nuclear aid are bound to acquire nuclear fuel 
from the USSR, and to return all spent nuclear fuel rods to the USSR. 
28 "Shevardnadze Urges Koreas to Reach Agreements", in FBIS-EAS-90-171 , 4 Sept 
1990. 
29 Frank Barnaby, Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Growing Threat in the 1990s? 
Conflict Studies 235, October/November 1990, pp.1-5. 
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already available in the open literature. The materials for such a device also appear to be 
easily acquired, either by reprocessing spent reactor fuel or from an alleged black market in 
plutonium. The technology required for constructing a reprocessing plant is also in the open 
literature. 
It has been estimated that the DPRK could produce enough plutonium for at least one 
nuclear weapon a year. 30 Other estimates indicate that the DPRK may already have enough 
plutonium to manufacture between 13 to 33 Hiroshima-type nuclear weapons.31 Not 
surprisingly, at the last NPT Review Conference, the ROK delegate urged the DPRK to 
comply with the NPT and IAEA regimes.32 
HOW THE DPRK COULD ACQUIRE NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
The USSR and the PRC 
Two broadcasts by Radio Moscow in March and April 1989 indicated Soviet aid in 
the DPRK's nuclear energy programme:33 
"A nuclear power plant, the first of its kind in (north) Korea, are among the 
new industrial projects the Soviet Union help (north) Korea construct ... "; 
and, 
"Some 30 (north) Korean scholars and engineers are trained at Dubna 
30 "U.S, USSR Worry Over DPRK Nuclear Development", in FBIS-EAS-90-078 , 23 
April 1990. 
31 "Pyongyang 'could produce 33 Hiroshima-type A-bombs''', in The Korea Herald, 7 
Oct 1989. However, it must be remembered that in the case of nuclear fuel from the 
USSR, the DPRK would be obliged to return all the spent nuclear fuel rods to the 
USSR. 
32 "South Urges North to Sign IAEA Safeguards", in FBIS-EAS-90-165, 24 Aug 1990. 
33 "Is Pyongyang Capable of Producing Nuclear Weapons?", in Vantage Point (hereafter 
VP), May 1989, Vol.XII, No.5, pp.18-21. 
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Combined Nuclear Institute in the Soviet Union. Many north Korean nuclear 
physicists have studied together with Soviet scientists since 1956 when the 
institute was founded." 
In December 1985, the USSR agreed to provide aid in the construction of a new 1760 
megawatt nuclear power plant in the DPRK. This was after Kim II Sung visited the USSR 
in 1984, a visit apparently motivated by Kim II Sung's concern :regarding the growing 
military power of the ROK. 34 The DPRK's apparent initial reluctance to acquire nuclear 
technology changed in 1984, with a reported agreement with the USSR regarding the transfer 
of nuclear technology to the DPRK.35 
That does not mean that the USSR would aid the DPRK's alleged quest for nuclear 
weapons. The USSR pressed the DPRK to sign the NPT; the 1760 megawatt nuclear plant 
was the reward for the DPRK's compliance. 36 From 1989 to mid-1990, the USSR 
apparently suspended all major arms shipments to the DPRK;3T construction of the 1760 
megawatt nuclear plant was also affected by this suspension.38 The USSR has apparently 
suspended all arms supplies to the DPRK again, according to ROK sources. 39 It will be 
34 Li Gye-hee, "The Changing Pattern of North Korea's Relations with China and the 
USSR (I)", in VP, May 1988, Vol.XI, No.5, pp.5-7. Also see "Soviets Now Deeply 
Involved in North Korea Militarily/Economically - Mockery of luche (Self-
Reliance)", in VP, Sept 1988, Vol.XI, No.9, p.15. 
35 Li Ki-taek, "Soviet Military Policy in the Far East and its Impact on North Korea 
(II)" ,in VP, May 1989, Vol.XII, No.5, pp.2-3. 
36 Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., "North Korea - set to join the nuclear club?", in IDW, 23 
Sept 1989, Vol:2, No.12, p.597. 
37 "The forgotten Far East" in US News and World Repon, 23 April 1990. Also see 
"USSR Suspends Modern Weapons to North Korea", in FBIS-EAS-90-165 , 24 Aug 
1990. 
38 USSR Suspends Help to DPRK Nuclear Plant", in FBIS-EAS-90-141 , 23 July 1990. 
39 "Moscow suspends arms supplies to Pyongyang: Report", in ST, 31 Oct 1991. 
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argued later that a nuclear-armed DPRK is not in the USSR's interests. 
However, the extent of the USSR's involvement in the DPRK's alleged nuclear 
ambitions remains unclear. The USSR pressed the DPRK into accepting the NPT after the 
USA indicated to the USSR its suspicions of the Yongbyon reactor's military potential.40 
Japanese security analysts also allege that Soviet military aid to the DPRK could possibly 
include nuclear aid.41 
It is possible that the DPRK could have received aid in acquiring nuclear weapons 
from the PRC.42 The PRe does have a questionable record in terms of nuclear aid;43 and, 
as already pointed out, the PRe has also not endorsed the NPT. However, in the case of 
Korea, given the PRe's emphasis on economic modernization, the PRC would not want to 
anger either the USA or the ROK by providing any nuclear assistance to the DPRK. Once 
proof of the PRC's hand in the DPRK's alleged nuclear ambitions became obvious, this 
would jeopardize PRC-ROK trade, now totalling about US$2 billion a y~.44 For other 
. 
reasons, the PRC may also have serious reservations about a nuclear-armed DPRK. 45 
40 "Status of North Korean Nuclear Facilities", in Arms Control Reponer, July 1990, 
p.457. 
41 "USSR Reportedly Continuing Aid to N.Korea", in FBIS-EAS-90-235, 6 Dec 1990. 
42 Joseph S. Bermudez Jr, "North Korea's Nuclear Programme", in Jane's Intelligence 
Review (hereafter JIR) , Summer 1991, p.408. 
43 For instance, US intelligence sources appear to indicate that the PRC had provided 
Iran with nuclear technologies and materials vital to the construction of nuclear 
weapons. See IrChina 'sold Iran device for making enriched uranium''', in The Straits 
Times (hereafter S1), 31 Oct 1991. 
44 "The Republic of Korea" ,in Defense and Diplomacy, May 1990, Vol.8, No.5, pp.57-
8. 
45 For instance, a nuclear-armed DPRK would be less amenable to PRC attempts to 
control the former's policies. Such a development would thus be contrary to the 
PRe's perception of its strategic interests. 
16 
In any case, the PRC is increasingly unlikely and unable to provide the DPRK with 
the logistical support and high-technology weaponry the latter has sought. 46 It is contended 
in this study that a nuclear-armed DPRK is contrary to the PRC's interests in Northeast Asia. 
The PRC may have a stake in a DPRK maintained as a buffer state against the USFK.47 
A militarily strong DPRK may be inimical to the PRC' s strategic interests. 
Other Sources 
Several West European countries could have provided the DRPK with key nuclear 
aid. The former Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) had a poor record of lax export 
control measures, allowing key nu·clear technologies to be exported to other states seeking 
various weapons of mass destruction.48 The FRG may have aided in the development of 
an amphibious capability in the KP A.49 Another potential source, France, recently declared 
its intention to work closely with the ROK in preventing horizontal nuclear proliferation in 
Korea. 50 The DPRK could also have secretly acquired nuclear aid from such countries as 
46 "The Republic of Korea", pp.57-8. Also see Dale Bumpers, "Time for New 
Thinking in South Korea", in The Baltimore Sun, 1 May 1990; and "North Korea-
USSR Military Ties Strengthening", in VP, Oct 1989, Vol. XII , No.10, p.1l. 
47 Gerald Segal and Anne Gilks, "China and the Arms Trade", in Anns Control: The 
Journal of Anns Control and Disarmament, Dec 1985, Vo1.6, No.3, pp.262-7l. 
48 Sam Bennett, If How nations gain nuclear capability", in The Philadelphia Inquirer, 
18 April 1990. Such weapons of mass destruction include chemical, biological and 
nuclear weapons. 
49 G. Jacobs, "North Korea's Growing Amphibious Warfare Capability", in Jane's 
Soviet Intelligence Review (hereafter JSIR), Oct 1990, Vo1.2, No.10, p.167. 
50 "Yi Sang-hun, France View DPRK Nuclear Arms", in FBIS-EAS-90-135, 3 Aug 
1990. 
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Egypt, the former German Democratic Republic, Iran, Libya, Romania or Syria.51 
Evidence also suggests, albeit tenuously, that the DPRK may be able to produce 
nuclear weapons indigenously.52 For instance, the technical specifications for Great 
Britain's Magnox reactor, a noted producer of weapons-grade plutonium, have been 
declassified. 53 The Yongbyon reactor could be a virtual r~plica of the Magnox reactor. 
Despite the DPRK's juche (self-reliance) ideology, technical cooperation with foreign 
corporations is allowed. 54 
However, it remains unclear if the level of science and technology in the DPRK 
would be able to support an indigenous nuclear weapons programme. Given the secretive 
nature of the DPRK, no definitive statement can be made. However, the fact that science 
and technology have been hampered by a slavish devotion to ideology does not augur well 
for such efforts. 55 
This study does not seek to answer the question of whether or not the DPRK has any 
51 Bermudez, "North Korea's nuclear programme", p.410. 
52 "Pyongyang on Verge of Producing Nuclear Weapons", in VP, July 1989, Vol.XII, 
No.7, pp. 11-13. 
53 Bermudez, "North Korea - set to join the nuclear club?", p.594. 
54 Shinn Rinn-Sup, "Political Trends in North Korea and their Implications for Inter-
Korean Relations", in Korea Observer, Winter 1988, Vol. XIX , No.4, p.414. 
According to Robert Scalapino, the DPRK made its first attempt to tum outwards in 
1972-73. See Robert A. Scalapino, "Asia's Future", in Foreign Affairs, Fall 1987, 
Vo1.66, No.1, pp.80-1. 
55 Kim Jong-hum, "The Level of North Korea's Science and Technology", in VP, Aug 
1988, Vol.XI, No.8, pp.l-l0. 
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nuclear ambitions. That has ably done by other analysts. 56 Rather, this study aims to 
examine the impact of the current uncertainties about the DPRK's nuclear ambitions on the 
security environment of Northeast Asia. Chapter Two will show that the current security 
environment in Northeast Asia does not favour the DPRK in the long run. The balance of 
military power in Korea probably still favours the DPRK. However, given the stronger ROK 
economy, the balance will probably swing in the ROK's favour in the near future. The ROK 
has also established relations with many former DPRK allies, such as the USSR; this merely 
confirms the trend in the security environment against the DPRK. This chapter will also 
present a brief analysis of the concepts of regional security and interdependence. 
In Chapter Three, the impact of existing uncertainties about the DPRK's nuclear 
ambitions on the Northeast Asian security environment will be explored. The chapter will 
focus on how the states involved in this region have been affected by the DPRK's alleged 
nuclear ambitions. It will be argued here that a nuclear-capable DPRK is not in the interests 
of the major powers in the region. 
Chapter Four will study the impact the current uncertainties has had on the inter-
related processes of arms control and reunification in Korea. It will be argued that both 
processes have suffered, as a result of the current uncertainties. However, this chapter will 
also suggest that neither process stood much chance of success in the first place. Chapter 
Five will conclude this study. 
56 See, for instance, Mack, "North Korea and the bomb"; Bermudez, "North Korea -
set to join the nuclear club?"; and Bermudez, "North Korea's Nuclear Programme". 
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THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT OF NORTHEAST ASIA 
In this chapter, the security environment of Northeast Asia will be analyzed. The 
security environment refers to the inter-state relationships in the region l which impact upon 
the security of individual states. The significant variables i~ the security environment are 
politics, military power and economics. 2 In the era of the so-called Cold War, two security 
blocs (for lack of a better term), existed: the USSR, the PRC, and the DPRK, on the one 
hand; apd the USA, Japan, and the ROK on the other. However, even during the Cold War, 
a complex web of interrelationships existed between the two blocs. 
Interdependence and Regional Security 
However, before any discussion of the Northeast Asian security environment can be 
undertaken, a brief discussion of the concepts of regional security and interdependence is 
required. In this discussion, security interdependence refers to a relationship of mutual 
vulnerability between states, such that they need to cooperate in order to satisfy individual 
security needs. 3 For instance, the USA, Japan and the ROK perceive the need to cooperate 
to satisfy individual and shared security needs. 
Simulaneously, security interdependence involves relations between antagonistic states. 
No ~tate can enhance its own security, vis-a-vis its adversary, without affecting negatively 
1 These states include the two Koreas, Japan, the PRC, the USSR and the USA. 
2 James W. Morley, "The Structure of Regional Power", in James W. Morley(ed.), 
Security Interdependence in the Asia Pacific Region (Lexington, Massachussetts: 
Lexington Books, 1986), pp.6-10. Because economic issues have become a 
significant variable of the security environment, states have to consider their 
economic interests in conceptualizing their security concerns. This is relevant to 
Northeast Asia. 
3 Ibid., pp.14-15. 
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the security of its adversary. Hence the ROK cannot enhance its security without affecting 
negatively the DPRK's security. Regional security thus refers to such relationships of 
security interdependence between the regional actors. Having said that, both Korean states 
apparently perceive security as a zero sum game; security is sought through unilateral 
measures. Balance of power thus becomes an important co~sideration in Northeast Asia. 
THE GREAT POWERS4 AND KOREA 
It should be noted "Korea's security has [historically] depended on the power 
configuration in Northeast Asia. ,,5 Korea served as the historical invasion route for rival 
empires in Northeast Asia. 6 Korea is often seen as a potential dagger pointed at either the 
PRC or Japan,? thus affecting superpower interests in these two states. Consequently, the 
great powers share a common desire for peace and stability in Korea. 8 
Improved inter-state relations have meant a less conflictual and tense region. 9 It may 
4 This term will be used to refer to the USA, the USSR, the PRC and Japan. 
5 Kim Sang Joon, "The Security of Small Countries: The Case for the Republic of 
Korea", in The Korean Journal of International Studies, Autumn 1990, Vol. XXI, 
No.3, p.383. 
6 Segal, Rethinking the Pacific, p. 130. 
7 Kim Kook-chin, "The Pivotal Security Linkage between the Korean Peninsula and 
Northeast Asia", in Korea and World Affairs, Fall 1985, Vo1.9, No.3, pp.491-2. 
8 Clough, Embatiled Korea, ch. 7. 
9 Kihl Young Whan, "The Korean Peninsula and Security Dilemma in the late 1980s" 
(hereafter "Korean Peninsula"), in Kihl Young Whan and Lawrence E. Grinter(eds.), 
Security, Strategy and Policy Responses in the Pacific Rim (hereafter Security, 
Strategy and Policy 'Responses) (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 
1989), p.141. Also see Baek Jong-chun, "North Korea's Military Policy and the 
Peace Process on the Korean Peninsula", in The Journal of East Asian Affairs, 
Summer/Fall 1990, Vol.IV, No.2, pp.211-3. 
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even be argued that a sense of a Pacific community has emerged. 10 In particular, there has 
been increased Asian self-awareness, increasing prosperity and increasing economic 
interdependence and interaction. These developments have allowed for accommodating, non-
antagonistic relations between states. However, the improved superpower relationship will 
not necessarily result in stability in Korea. As such, the great powers have great incentives 
, 
to work towards the creation of an NWFZ in Korea. 11 
The USSR and the PRC 
Both states have to come to terms with the so-called Newly-Industrializing Countries 
(NICs), especially the ROK.12 The normalization of Sino-Soviet relations has apparently 
had a positive impact on the Northeast Asian security environment, allowing both states to 
~ decrease military spending, replace military with economic ties, decrease the level of Sino-
Soviet competition for the DPRK's support, and seek and consolidate linkages and economic 
ties with the ROK. 13 
At the same time, both states regard inter-Korean dialogue as an important means of 
lowering inter-Korean tensions. 14 The old Sino-Soviet competition for influence in the 
10 John W. Lewis, "Defming the Strategic Context in Asia: Regional Change and the 
Prospects for Peace in Korea", in Korea Journal, July 1989, Vo1.29, No.7, pp.30-9. 
11 Lawrence E. Grinter, "Policy of the United States Toward East Asia: Tough 
Adjustments", in Security, Strategy and Policy Responses, p.34. 
12 Gerald Segal, The Soviet Union and the Pacific (Boston: Unwin Hyman, Inc., 1990) , 
pp.188-94. 
13 Banh Chan Young, "Prospect of Korean-Soviet Economic Cooperation and Its Impact 
on Security and Stability of the Korean Peninsula", in The Korean Journal of 
Intenuuional Studies, Autumn 1990, Vol. XXI , No.3, pp.319-20. 
14 "PRC Hopes for North, South Talks Noted", in FBIS-CHI-90-172, 5 Sept 1990. 
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DPRK has been replaced by the realization of common interests in the status quo in 
Korea. 15 By ensuring their continuing ability to influence DPRK policy, both great powers 
hope to prevent the DPRK from destabilizing the region. The trade relations both great 
powers now have with the ROK also gives both states a stake in the political and economic 
viability of both Korean states. 16 
That does not mean neither would not welcome a unified Korea. 17 Nonetheless, two 
caveats must temper this point: the Sino-Soviet relationship is now more cooperative than 
adversarial; and a unified Korea would not be amenable to either Soviet or Chinese 
influence. 18 In any case, a unified Korea may not necessarily be in the interests of either 
state. It is worth noting at this point that Soviet and Chinese interests in Northeast Asia also 
ff ~... consist of conflicting and contradicting elements, which affect how these great powers view 
III: 
the region. 
For the USSR, the security environment has improved dramatically since the early 
1980s. 19 The USSR has also ceased to "idealise 'socialist international relations'''. 20 
15 Gary Klintworth, "China's Security Policy", in Security, Strategy and Policy 
Responses, p.108. 
16 Giovanni Graziani, Gorbachev's Economic Strategy in the Third World The 
Washington Papers 142 (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1990). 
17 Young Hon Kang, "Security Policy", in Koo Youngnok and Han Soonjoo(eds.), The 
Foreign Policy of the Republic of Korea (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1985), pp.53-4. 
18 Were Korea to be unified under Kim II Sung, there would be less reason for Kim to 
continue to seek the patronage of either great power. A Korea unified under the 
ROK would not be amenable to Soviet or Chinese influence either. 
19 Robert A. Scalapino, "Asia in a Global Context: Strategic Issues for the Soviet 
Union", in Richard H. Solomon and Masataka Kosaka(eds.), The Soviet Far East 
Military Buildup: Nuclear Dilemmas and Asian Security (Dover, Massachussetts: 
Auburn House Publishing Company, 1986), pp.21-39. Also see Segal, The Soviet 
Union and the Pacific, pp. 97 -9. 
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Clearly, the USSR would like to see such trends continuing. Increasing tension or another 
war in Korea may damage Soviet efforts at consolidating its relations with the other East 
Asian states, in particular, economic relations with the ROK, which is important for 
perestroika. 21 Thus, the USSR has been the main initiator of arms control proposals in 
Northeast Asia. 22 To some extent, Soviet initiatives appear to be motivated . by its 
perception of its disadvantageous position vis-a-vis the other regional great powers. It may 
also be linked to Soviet perceptions of the need to protect vital security interests here. 23 
The PRC argues that its relations with the two Koreas should enhance regional peace 
and stability.24 The PRC is aware that another Korean war would probably involve the 
PRC.25 The PR~ thus supports all NWFZ proposals in Korea. 26 The considerations that 
influence Soviet policy in Korea are also equally applicable to the PRC. 
The USA and Japan 
20 Nina G. Golovyatenko and Artem Yu.Rudnitsky, "In Search of Soviet Policy in the 
Pacific", in The Pacific Review, Vol.3, No.3, 1990, p.204. 
21 This would be due to the strong anti-Soviet sentiments in the ROK. 
22 Bonnie S. Glasser, "Soviet, Chinese and US perspectives on arms control in North-
East Asia", in Security and arms control, pp.166-90. 
23 Banning S. Garret, "Gorbachev's reassessment of Soviet security needs: Implications 
for North-East Asia", in Security and arms control, pp.50-69. These security 
interests include the need to protect the sea lines of communications (SLOC), as well 
as the ballistic submarine bases in the sea of Okhotsk. 
24 State Council Spokesman Yuan Mu Interviewed", FBIS-CHI-90-148, 1 Aug 1990. 
25 Cha Young-koo, "Strategic Environment of Northeast Asia: A Korean Perspective", 
in Korea and World Affairs, Summer 1986, Vol. 10, No.2, p.292. 
26 "Qian Qichen Clarifies 'Disarmament Stand"', in FBIS-CHI-90-043, 5 March 1990. 
Also see "Diplomat on Nuclear Proliferation Responsibility", in FBIS-CHI-90-122, 
25 June 1990. 
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The US military presence in Northeast Asia looks set to change.27 The Nunn-
Warner amendment to the fiscal year 1990-91 defense authorization bill gave several 
prOVISIons: 
a. the reassessment of the force structure, missions and location of the USFK; 
b. regular ROK-USA negotiations on the feasibility of l!SFK reductions; and 
c. a five-year plan on restructuring the USFK into a supporting role in the defense of 
the ROK. 
Most significantly, the amendment provided a timetable for USFK withdrawals. 28 The 
DPRK response to this amendment will be discussed in Chapter Four. The likelihood of 
these changes has been enhanced by the recent ROK -USA agreement for the ROK to 
maintain facilities providing logistical support for US troops in the event of another Korean 
war. 29 Several other factors also permit the reduction, if not withdrawal, of the USFK: the 
USA-ROK mutual security treaty (See Appendix Three), and the Korean military balance.3o 
It should be noted that planned reductions in US military spending on the ROK do not 
affect US commitments to ROK security; it merely reflects the need for the USA to decrease 
military spending. This is due to several factors, including the changing superpower 
relationship and the worsening US economy. At the same time, given the ROK's increasing 
27 Kihl Young Whan, "Re-examining the United States Security Role in Korea: The 
Politics of Troop Reduction and Defense Burden Share", in Korea Observer, Oct 
1990, Vo1.30, No.10, pp.48-50. 
28 The USFK would be withdrawn in three stages: 1991-93, where 1000 USAF 
personnel and 5000 US Army personnel from support and headquarters (HQ) 
functions would be withdrawn; and flexible withdrawal schedules for the 1994-95 and 
post-1996 stages. 
29 "Security Council Meeting With U.S. Reported", in FBIS-EAS-90-010, 15 Jan 1990. 
30 Ralph N. Clough, "U.S.-Korean Relations in the year 2000", in Han Sung-joo and 
Robert J. Myers(eds.), Korea: The Year 2000 (hereafter Korea) (Lanham: University 
Press of America, Inc., 1987), pp.27-8. 
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economic power, US security interests in the state have increased as well. 
To some extent, US interests in Northeast Asia are linked to its worldwide interests; 
in the event of a European war, the aim of the US would be to "keep the Pacific pacific" .31 
Japan and the ROK, as key elements in the US military-industrial complex, would be the 
focus of US strategy in the Pacific. Such thinking on the Korean situation reflects the classic 
Cold War logic of the 1950s.32 
Korea remains vital to the security of Japan.33 The Japanese plan to restore the 1 % 
ceiling on defense spending thus indicates Japan's perception of a more stable security 
environment. In particular, the traditional basis of Japanese defense spending - in support 
of US military efforts against the USSR - has been eroded by recent developments in the 
USSR and USSR-Japan relations.34 But Japan continues to contribute to regional security 
and stability through the continued presence of US forces in Japan (USFJ) and Japanese 
economic aid to other regional countries. 35 
THE DPRK AND THE GREAT POWERS 
In the case of the DPRK, policy is very much shaped by the dispositions and interests 
of Kim II Sung. One objective of the juche ideology is the legitimization of Kim's regime, 
31 James R. Kurth, "The United States and the North Pacific", in Security and arms 
control, pp.27-49. Kurth argues that the Korean war was fought partly to 
demonstrate the credibility of US security commitments to Europe. 
32 Doug Bandow, "Seoul Long", in The American Spectator, Nov 1990. 
33 Defense of Japan 1989 (Japan: Japan Defense Agency, 1989), pp.56-61. 
34 "Japan is Moving to Scale Back Military Spending", in The New York Times, 12 pec 
1990. 
35 Michael Leifer, "External Relationships and Political Stability", in Security 
. Interdependence in the Asia Pacific Region, p.l64. 
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as well as the virtually inevitable hereditary succession of Kim Jong Il.36 It will be argued 
later that such considerations affect DPRK relations with the great powers. 
The USA and Japan 
Several developments in the late 1980s may have imprOVed the DPRK's security 
environment. In particular, improved superpower relations allowed the USA to decrease 
military spending, and provided for greater fluidity in the DPRK's relations with the USA 
and Japan. 37 The DPRK must open up to the capitalist world to strengthen its weak 
economy. This partly explains the DPRK law allowing limited joint economic ventures with 
non-Communist states. 38 However, the DPRK remains cautious about such contacts 
encouraging the acceptance of a two-Korea concept. 39 In this respect, the USA has 
stipulated that US-DPRK relations must be preceded by tension-reducing measures in Korea, 
and must create an atmosphere conducive to reunification.4o 
• 
It is worth noting that until the 1960s, the DPRK's only contact with non-Communist 
states was Japan.41 Japan's formal recognition of the ROK as the sole legitimate Korean 
36 Park Han S., "Juche as a Foreign Policy Constraint in North Korea", in Park Jae 
Kyu, Koh Byung Chul and Kwak Tae-Hwan(eds.), The Foreign Relations of North 
Korea: New Perspectives (hereafter Foreign Relations of North Korea) (Seoul: 
Kyungnam University Press, 1987), pp.59-80. 
37 Norman D. Levin, "Global Detente and North Korea's Strategic Relations", in The 
Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Summer 1990, Vol.II, No.2, pp.45-8. 
38 Joseph S. Chung, "North Korea's Economic Developmetn and Capabilities" , In 
Foreign Relations of North Korea, pp.107-35. 
39 Clough, Embattled Korea, ch.12. 
40 "YONHAP Covers U.S. Remarks on Regional Role", in FBIS-EAS-90-211, 31 Oct 
1990. 
41 Bruce Cumings, "North Korea: Security in the Circle of Great-Power Confrontation" , 
in The Great-Power Triangle and Asian Security, pp.162-3. 
28 
government in 1965 did not include recognition of the ROK's jurisdiction over the DPRK.42 
The absence of formal DPRK-Japan relations has not prevented the consolidation of cultural 
and economic links between the two states;43 by the end of 1989, there were 98 joint 
economic ventures between the DPRK and Japan.44 
However, since June 1990, several factors have facilitated attempts by both states to 
formalize their relations. 45 These include: the Roh-Gorbachev San Francisco meeting; 
Japan's subsequent perception of being upstaged by the ROK in its relations with Communist 
states; and the DPRK's need for foreign investment and technology. The on-going DPRK-
ROK talks may provide Japan with greater flexibility in pursuing its relations with the 
DPRK. 
DPRK-Japanese relations have been further encouraged by several other 
developments. Recently, two Japanese, imprisoned by DPRK authorities for 7 years for 
alleged acts of espionage against the DPRK, were released. 46 The PRC has encouraged 
further DPRK-Japan talks.47 Japan and the DPRK held full-dress normalization talks on 30 
42 Clough, Embattled Korea, pp.352-63. 
43 Shin Jung Hyun, "North Korea's Policy Toward Japan: Perceptions, Goals, Trends", 
in Foreign Relations of North Korea, pp.276-93. 
44 "North Korean-Japanese Joint Ventures Detailed", in FBIS-EAS-90-193, 4 Oct 1990. 
45 Kim Hong Nack, "The Normalization of North Korean-Japanese Relations" Problems 
and Prospects", in Korea and World Affairs, Winter 1990, Vol.XIV, No.4, pp.655-8. 
46 "DPRK Releases Seamen After 7 -Year Detention", in FBIS-EAS-90-197, 11 Oct 
1990. Also see "Two seamen return from North Korea", in The Japan Times, 14 Oct 
1990. 
47 "Japan Passes Note to DPRK Via Jiang Zemin", in FBIS-CHI-90-114, 14 June 1990. 
This is but one example. Also see Zhu Ronggen, "Breakthrough in DPRK-Japan 
Relations", in Beijing Review (hereafter BR), 22-28 Oct 1990, Vo1.33, No.43, pp.9-
10. The PRC has long been the conduit for communications between Japan and the 
DPRK. 
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II~ January 1991; both agreed to continue discussions on the Yongbyon nuclear plant and the 
Safeguards Agreement. 48 Despite the lack of agreement, these talks were seen as amicable; 
because this was the flrst round of offlcial talks, . no real progress was expected~49 A second 
round of talks in Tokyo was also agreed on. The DPRK delegate, Vice Premier Kim Young-
nam, noted that there were no real differences between the positions of the two states.50 
The DPRK also expressed interest in the idea of transforming the Sea of Japan into a "sea 
of prosperity" . 51 
However, problems in the DPRK-Japan relationship exist. The DPRK has criticized 
Japan's continued support for the USFK,52 which the DPRK still seeks to remove.53 
Currently, the main contentious issues revolve around war reparations, trade, representation, 
and the DPRK's signature of the Safeguards Agreement. Further obstacles to normal DPRK-
Japan relations arise from the lack of consensus within the ruling Japanese Liberal 
Democratic Party (LDP) of the issue of reparations, and differences between Japan and the 
48 "Japan-North Korea talks end with agreement to meet in Pyongyang", in 
SWBIFEI095 0 , 18 Dec 1990. Also see "Text of Preliminary Talks Agreement with 
Japan", in FBIS-EAS-90-243, 18 Dec 1990" ; and "Date set for North Korean-Japan 
talks on normalising relations", in SWBIFEI0969 , 14 Jan 1991. 
49 "North Korean Delegate on Final Day of Normalization Talks with Japan", In 
SWBIFEI0985 , 1 Feb 1991. 
50 "North Koreab ,Vice-Premier Comments on Japan-DPRK Normalization Talks", in 
SWBIFEI0986 , 2 Feb 1991. 
51 Clayton Jones, "East-West Thaw a Boon for Nations on the Sea of Japan", In 
Christian Science Monitor, 27 Sept 1990. 
52 "Japan's Support of US Troop Presence Viewed", in FBIS-EAS-90-180 , 17 Sept 1990. 
53 Ralph N. Clough, "North Korea and the US", in Foreign Relations of North Korea, 
pp.255-73. 
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DPRK over the amount of reparations. 54 
As such, it may be premature to expect full diplomatic relations between the DPRK 
and Japan. The problems discussed above still await resolution. 55 While Japan welcomes 
a stable and secure DPRK, Japan's economic viability and political stability also depend very 
much on the stability and economic viability of such states as the ROK.56 At the same time, 
the ROK remains vital to the defense of Japan. 57 
The USSR and the PRC 
The DPRK's ideal world appears to be the bipolar Cold War era. 58 The DPRK 
seems to perceive its security environment through the prism of ideology, historical 
experience, and personality dispositions of its key actors in policy formulation, particularly 
Kim II Sung. 59 
The improved superpower relationship since the late 1980s and the Soviet and Chinese 
54 Kim Hong Nack, op.cit., pp.688-?0. In particular, to the DPRK, the issue of war 
reparations remains "the most important issue in liquidating the past between DPRK 
and Japan." See "North Korean Delegation Head on Compensation Issue in Talks 
with Japan", in SWBIFEI0985, 1 Feb 1991. 
55 "'Many difficult items' on agenda for North Korea-Japan talks", in SWBIFEI0951 , 
19 Dec 1990. Japan's position is that it is not legally bound to pay for war damages. 
However, Japan recently said that while it is not responsible for reparations cause by 
hostile relations, it is willing to fulfil obligations relating to the colonial era. See 
"Tokyo envoy woos Pyongyang", in The Australian, 1 Feb 1991. 
56 Masashi Nishihara, "Japan: Regional Stability", in Security Interdependence in the 
Asia Pacific Region, pp.65-91. 
57 Edward A. Olsen, "U.S.-Japan Security Relations after Nakasone: The Case for a 
Strategic Fairness Doctrine", in Ted Galen Carpenter(ed.), Collective Defense or 
Strategic Independence? Alternative Strategies for the Future (Lexington, 
Massachussetts: Lexington Books, 1989), p.?? 
58 Cumings, Ope cit., pp.153-9. 
59 Koh Byung Chul, "North Korean Foreign Policy-Making Process", in Foreign 
Relations of North Korea, pp.39-55. 
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preoccupation with economic reform and rejuvenation have had a negative impact on the 
DPRK's interests. 60 Both the USSR and the PRC now have increasing stakes in peace and 
stability in Korea and in friendly relations with the ROK; this has diminished -the DPRK's 
leverage over these two states. In fact, improved ROK-USSR and ROK-PRC relations have 
increased pressure on the DPRK to initiate political and economic reform61 , something it 
has been loathe to do. 62 
The normalization of Soviet -ROK relations does not alleviate this problem for the -
DPRK. Roh Tae Woo's recent USSR visit was thus seen as a particular setback for the 
DPRK. 63 Unfortunately for the DPRK, there appears to be little in the 1961 USSR-DPRK 
security treaty that precludes formal ROK-USSR relations. (See Appendix 1) This 
development appears to be a USSR attempt to press the DPRK into following the Soviet 
policy line.64 The USSR has apparently been reticent to supply the DPRK with weapons 
that could tilt the Korean military balance towards the DPRK.65 
60 Levin, op.cit., p.39. Also see LeifRosenberger and Marian Leighton, "Gorbachev's 
New Strategic Designs for Asia", in Security, Strategy and Policy Responses, p.66. 
61 Lee Hy-sang, "North Korea's Closed Economy: The Hidden Opening", in Asian 
Survey, Dec 1988, Vol. XXVII, No.12, pp.1264-79. 
62 Segal, The Soviet Union and the Pacific, pp.57-9. 
63 "South Korean Makes 1st Soviet Visit", in The Washington Post, 14 Dec 1990. This 
visit coincides with the ROK strategy of isolating the DPRK, thus reducing the threat 
the DPRK would pose to the ROK. Also see James Cotton, "Pyongyang Cast 
Adrift", in The Pacific Review, Vo1.3, No.3, 1990, p.275. The DPRK reacted to the 
establishment of Soviet-ROK ties by reminding the USSR that official recognition of 
the ROK contravenes the 1961 USSR-DPRK security treaty. 
64 Kim Ilpyong J., "Policies Toward China and the Soviet Union", in The Foreign 
Policy of the Republic of Korea, pp.204-5. 
65 Peter Polomka, "Security Issues on the Korean Peninsula", in Security and arms 
control, p.115. 
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What may be a further problem for the DPRK must be the new Soviet willingness to 
abandon previously important allies. 66 In this context, the strategic relevance of the DPRK 
to the USSR must now be considered. Gerald Segal has argued that with a common border 
that extends some 20 km, the DPRK is not a "strategic glacis" for the USSR.67 However, 
other factors must be considered. The DPRK appears to be an important link in the Soviet 
collective security proposal for the Asia-Pacific region. 68 Access to ports in the DPRK for 
Soviet naval vessels, particularly Najin, enhances Soviet access to the Pacific Ocean. The 
DPRK also acts as a buffer zone for Vladivostok.69 The DPRK also provides the USSR 
with an air corridor into Southeast Asia.70 
Precisely because of its international isolation, the DPRK's economic and military 
dependence on the USSR may increase.71 DPRK-USSR trade in the late 1980s amounted 
66 Mark N. Katz, Gorbachev's Military Policy in the Third World The Washington 
Papers 140 (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1989). Also see Graziani, op.cit., ch.l. 
Both authors argue that the USSR is now more willing to jettison former allies that 
are both economic burdens and politicalliabili~ies. The DPRK would come under 
such a classification. 
67 Segal, Rethinking the Pacific, p.220. 
68 Joseph M. Ha and Linda Beth Jensen, "Soviet policy Toward North Korea", in The 
Foreign Relations of Nonh Korea, pp.155-7. 
69 Stephen Kirby, The Two Koreas - Conflict or Compromise? The Washington Papers 
207 (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1988). Also see Milivojevic. op.cit. " p.261. 
The Soviet navy appears to have access to the DPRK ports of Najin, Wonsan and 
Nampo. The DPRK also has overflight rights through DPRK airspace, and its bases 
in the DPRK are directly across the PRC's most heavily industrialised areas. See A. 
James Gregor, "The People's Republic of China and U.S. Security Policy in East 
Asia", in Collective Defense, p.l09. 
70 Kihl Young Whan, "Korean Peninsula", pp.142-6. 
71 Asian Security 1989-90 (Tokyo: Research Institute for Peace and Security , 1989), 
pp.145-7. 
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to 40% of the DPRK's total trade turnover.72 Between 1984 and 1988, DPRK-USSR trade 
grew from US$400 million to US$890 million.73 This may increase Soviet leverage over 
DPRK policy.74 The DPRK has come to rely more on the USSR than on PRC for military 
and economic aid. By 1986, DPRK-USSR trade had doubled that of DPRK-PRC trade.75 
That does not meant hat the DPRK has ceased to rely on the PRC.76 Nonetheless, 
, 
the PRC appears to have acquired a stake in peace and stability in Korea. Renewed Korean 
hostilities could stimulate Japanese rearmament, and increase the USSR's influence over the 
DPRK.n Several other problems also continue to plague DPRK-PRC relations: differing 
perceptions of- the role of the USFK, Korean reunification, the personality cult in the DPRK, 
and economic policies. 
That does not mean that DPRK-PRC relations are bad per se. The DPRK-PRC 
alliance treaty remains intact until both parties agree to its termination. (See Appendix 2) 
DPRK-PRC relations have recently improved. The DPRK supported the PRC government's 
handling of the Tienanmen· Square incident of June 1989.78 Kim II Sung visited the PRC 
72 Segal, The Soviet Union and the Pacific, pp.156-9. 
73 "DPRK's Economic, Trade Difficulties Reported", in FBIS-EAS-90-242 , 17 Dec 
1990. 
74 Herbert J. Ellison, The Soviet Union and nonheast Asia (Lanham: University Press 
of America, Inc., 1989), pp.45-6. 
75 Segal, Rethinking the Pacific, pp.33-40. 
76 Hwang Byon-moo, "The Evolution of U.S.-China Security Relations and Its 
Implications for the Korean Peninsula", in Asian Perspective, Spring-Summer 1990, 
Vol. 14, No.1, pp.69-90. In the late 1980s, despite relying on trade and investment 
from the western capitalist countries, the PRC continued arms sales and transfers to 
the DPRK. 
n Chung Chin-wee, "North Korea's Relations with China", in The Foreign Relations 
of Nonh Korea, pp.183-97. 
78 "DPRK Official Supports PRC on June Riot", in FBIS-CHI-89-184, 25 Sept 1989. 
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in 1990 in an apparent attempt to counteract Soviet-ROK rapprochemene9 ; it reflected the 
DPRK's perceived need to consolidate DPRK-PRC relations. 80 In October 1991, Kim II 
Sung paid another visit to the PRC. 81 Kim's 1990 visit followed a visit · by Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Jiang Zemin to the DPRK82 , which resulted in 
a flurry of exchanges between officials of both states, particularly between KP A and People's 
Liberation Army (PLA) officials. 83 
THE ROK AND THE GREAT POWERS 
The role of the ROj( armed forces (ROKAF) in the ROK policy process cannot be 
overstated. The ROKAF is one of the main background forces of the ROK government. 84 
Thus it has great influence over ROK foreign and security policy. 85 As such, ROK policy 
towards the DPRK reflects the ROKAF concern about isolating the DPRK internationally, 
so as to reduce the DPRK threat to the ROK. This in turn influences ROK relations with the 
79 See "Kim II-sung's 'Secret' Visit to PRC Reported", in FBIS-EAS-90-177, 12 Sept 
1990; and "Editorial of Kim's Intentions", in FBIS-EAS-90-179, 14 Sept 1990. 
80 "DRPK Official Views Visit", in FBIS-CHI-90-052, 16 Mar 1990. 
81 See "North Korea's Kim begins visit to China", in ST, 4 Oct 1991; and "China gives 
high-level welcome to Kim", in ST, 5 Oct 1991. Although the leaders of both states 
reaffirmed their friendship, the DPRK failed to gain economic aid from the PRC. 
See "Kyodo reports Kim II-sung did not get economic aid from PRe", in 
SWBIFEI1203, 15 Oct 1991. 
82 "LIAOWANG Reviews Jaing's North Korea Visit", in FBIS-CHI-90-054 , 20 Mar 
1990. A statement of DPRK-PRC solidarity was issued at the close of Jiang's visit. 
83 DPRK's 0 Chin-u Calls on Jiang Zemin", in FBIS-CHI-90-058, 26 Mar 1990; and 
"PLA Delegation Leaves for DPRK Visit", in FBIS-CHI-90-075, 18 April 1990. 
84 Thomas W. Robinson, "Korea 2000: The Political Component", in Korea, pp.69-71. 
85 William H. Gleysteen Jr., "Korea's Foreign Policy in the Year 2000", in Korea, 
p.45. 
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great powers. 
The USA and Japan 
US security concerns in Northeast Asia revolve around Japan and the -ROK. 86 In 
particular, US policy was predicated on the perceived need to contain the USSR.87 A three-
way alliance between the USA, Japan and the ROK was also once mooted. 88 How relevant 
are these perceptions now? 
During the Cold War, it was necessary for the USA to protect the approaches to key 
states such as Japan; consequently, the defense of the ROK was important.89 Japan and the 
ROK were significant in preventing Soviet egress from the Sea of Japan. 90 Before the ROK 
National Assembly in 1989, President Bush reaffirmed the importance of the USA-ROK 
economic and strategic partnership to US interests.91 
Nonetheless, it seems clear that the USA-ROK relationship has changed. The ROK's 
increasing self-confidence, due partly to its growing economic power, has allowed the ROK 
to seek ties with the PRC and other states independently.92 The ROK's growing military 
86 Richard K. Betts, "The United States: Global Deterrence", in Security 
JnJerdependence in the Asia Pacific Region, pp.29-63. 
87 Han Sung-joo, "Policy Towards the US", in The Foreign Policy of the Republic of 
Korea, pp.140-1. 
88 "Korea's Military Alliance with U.S.-Japan Envisaged for the 1990s", in The Korea 
Herald, 24 Sept 1989. 
89 Eugene V. Rostow, "A Breakfast for Bonaparte: There Is No alternative Strategy", 
in Collective Defense, p.8. 
90 Gregor, op.cit., pp.111-4. 
91 "Remarks by U.S. President George Bush, Delivered before the Republic of Korea 
National Assembly, Seoul, February 27, 1989", in Korea and World Affairs, Spring 
1989, Vol. 13, No.1, pp.211-4. 
92 Han Sung-joo, op. cit., pp.162-4. 
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power has also helped in this respect. 93 At the same time, the improving superpower 
relationship has diminished the ROK's importance as a front-line state to the USA. USFK 
reductions and redeployment reflects the changes in the security environment and in the 
• 
USA-ROK relations. 94 
This process of change has to contend with several other factors. In particular, many 
ROK citizens still appear to see the USFK as vital to the security of the ROK and the region 
in general. 95 The ROKAF still depends on the USA in terms of force structure and 
formation, operational doctrines, and arms and equipment sales. 96 This is despite ROK 
efforts to develop other internal and external sources of strength in countering the perceived 
military threat from the DPRK. 97 
ROK-Japan relations have been described as good, despite Japan's relations with the 
DPRK. 98 Japan remains important to the ROK's economic development. The ROK has 
93 Lee Hong Yung, "South Korea: Bipolarity, Multipolarity and the Northern Threat", 
in The Great-Power Triangle and Asian Security, pp.131-51. In 1975, ROK 
President Park Chung Hee declared that the ROK would "do anything necessary to 
insure its survival, including the development of nuclear weapons - if the US's 
nuclear umbrella is withdrawn. " 
94 Kihl Young Whan, "Re-examining the United States Security Role in Korea", pp.44-
52. Also see "US troops' withdraw from N.Korean border", in ST, 3 Oct 1991; and 
"US 'to remove all N-weapons from S.Korea"', in ST, 20 Oct 1991. 
95 "Article Analyzes Impact of U.S. Force Reductions", in FBIS-EAS-90-130, 6 July 
1990. 
96 Kim Sang Joon, op. cit., p.388. 
97 illo Kyongsoo, "Prospects for Confidence-Building and Arms Control Measures in 
the Korean Peninsula", in The Korean Journal of International Studies, Summer 
1990, Vol. XXI , No.2, p.189. For instance, the AROK is becoming increasingly self-
sufficient in weapons production. 
98 Hahn Bae Ho, "Policy Toward Japan", in The Foreign Policy of the Republic of 
Korea, pp.176-99. 
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also played down efforts by Japanese politicians to improve DPRK-Japan relations. The 
ROK Foreign Minister said in August 1990 that recent DPRK-Japan contacts remained 
insignificant because they were non-governmental talks. 99 ROK officials also stated that 
they welcomed such efforts by Japan to improve its relations ' with the DPRK. lOO In 
December 1990, ROK and Japanese defense ministers urged closer defense cooperation 
between the two armed forces. 101 
However, ROK-Japan relations have suffered in the wake of badly-timed 
developments in the DPRK-Japan relationship. For instance, Japan announced its intention 
to open contacts with the DPRK just as the ROK itself was about to open its borders to the 
DPRK. I02 The ROK's Nordpolitik strategy of isolating the DPRK internationally was to 
!! I . induce the DPRK to open its borders to the ROK. The prospect of DPRK-Japan contacts 
:I 
thus sabotaged such ROK strategies. A further problem arose with Shin Kan em aru , s visit 
to the DPRK, and his offer to help establish formal DPRK-Japan relations. 103 
~ 
The USSR and the PRC 
99 "Choe Ho-chung Views Japan-DPRK Relations", in FBIS-EAS-90-148, 1 Aug 1990. 
100 "Japan's Efforts to Improve DPRK Ties Viewed", in FBIS-EAS-90-137, 17 July 1990. 
The contradiction between such statements and the ROK's apparent policy of isolating 
the DPRK internationally appears to indicate that such statements by ROK officials 
were more for rhetorical purposes. 
101 "Defense Chiefs Stress Cooperation", in FBIS-EAS-90-236 , 7 Dec 1990. Also see 
"Premier Urges ,Closer Defense Ties With Japan", in FBIS-EAS-90-237 , 10 Dec 
1990. 
102 "Kaifu welcomes DPRK invitation for LDP visit", in SWBIFEI0827 , 26 July 1990. 
Also see "Japanese government and parties to discuss improved ties with North 
Korea", in SWBIFEI0828, 28 July 1990. 
103 "Way called clear for official talks with Pyongyang", in The Japan Times, 3 Oct 
1990. Shin Kanemaru was one of the top backers of the former Japanese Prime 
Minister, Toshiki Kaifu. 
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The Soviet military buildup in the Far East in the early 1980s was seen by the ROK 
as having a potentially negative impact on the ROK's security.104 However, the perception 
of Soviet or Chinese threats to ROK security interests may be unfounded. As already stated, 
both states share interests in economic investment and trade from the ROK. At the same 
time, both great powers acknowledge several preconditio~s for a USFK withdrawal or 
reduction. 105 In particular, stable inter-Korean relations and greater ROK confidence in 
its relationship with the USSR have to be realized first. 
The Soviet stand on relations with the ROK has evolved, from the non-recognition 
of the ROK in 1988106, to conditional recognition of the ROK107, to the establishment of 
formal diplomatic relations between the two states. Roh's December 1990 USSE visit after 
the establishment of full diplomatic relations was the first official visit by an ROK Head of 
State to Moscow. 108 In 1991, the ROK extended an offer of US$3 billion in soft loans and 
credit guarantees to the USSR.109 ROK -USSR trade is expected to reach US$10 billion by 
1995. 110 At the same time, the ROK has come to depend on the USSR for key 
104 Ha Young-sa, "The Soviet Military Build-up in the Far East: Implications for the 
Security of South Korea", in The Soviet Far East Military Build-Up, pp.141-54. 
105 Ell· . 47· 8 Ison, op.czt., pp. -. 
106 "Excerpts from a Joint Communique on the Visit to North Korea by Soviet Foreign 
Minister E.A. Shevardnadze, Pyongyang, December 24, 1988", in Korea and World 
Affairs, Spring 1989, Vol. 13, No.1, pp.177-9. 
107 "Shev: nuke-free S.K. may mean formal ties with Moscow", in The Korea Herald, 
22 Nov 1989. The condition was that the ROK accepts the DPRK's NWFZ proposal. 
108 "No Tae-u returns to Seoul from Moscow", in SWBIFEI095 0 , 18 Dec 1990. Roh 
declared that the visit had "opened a new history and an era of peace and unification 
on the Korean peninsula." 
109 "Making Friends in the Kremlin", in Asiaweek, 4 Jan 1991. 
110 "Trade With East Bloc To Grow 70 Percent in 1991", in 5FBIS-EAS-90-206, 24 Oct 
1990. 
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technologies that it cannot acquire from the USA, Japan or Western Europe. 111 
All this indicates several features about Soviet thinking on the ROK. In particular, 
the USSR no longer appears to be committed to the defense of the DPRK. l12 The 
downturn in DPRK-USSR relations appears to be motivated partly by the Soviet perception 
that the DPRK does not consitute a genuine people's republi~; it also reflects the improved 
security environment of Northeast Asia. 113 
These efforts at developing ROK-USSR relations correspond with the ROK's 
Nordpolitik strategy. At the same time, the improved ROK-USSR relationship may lead to 
a reduction 'in Soviet military aid to the DPRK. 114 This has already happened, although 
it is unclear if this development was motivated by the ROK-USSR relationship. However, 
despite these advancements, the USSR remains cautious about any sense of euphoria over the 
establishment of ROK-USSR relations. 115 
As for ROK-PRC relations, it has been suggested that the PRC has unofficially 
recognized the ROK since 1972. 116 Since then, ROK-PRC trade relations have developed 
111 "ROK, USSR Agree to Exchange Technologies", in FBIS-EAS-90-168, 29 Aug 1990. 
112 Ahn Byung-Joon, "South Korean-Soviet Relatins: Issues and Prospects", in Korea and 
World Affairs, Winter 1990, Vol.XIV, No.4, pp.671-86. 
113 Constantine V. Pleshakov, "Republic of Korea-USSR Relations: Psychological 
Choices and Political Challenges", in Korea and World Affairs, Winter 1990, 
Vol. XIV, No.4, pp.786-804. 
114 "USSR Ties, Inter-Korean Issues Viewed", in FBIS-EAS-90-189, 28 Sept 1990. 
115 "Soviet Official on Developing Seoul-Moscow Ties", in FBIS-EAS-90-246 , 21 Dec 
1990. The Soviets argued that the projected benefits from this relationship will take 
some time before they canbe realized . . 
116 Kim Ilpyong J., op.cit., pp.209-11. 
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steadily. In 1989', two-way trade between these state~ exceeded US$3 billion.117 From 
January to June 1990, over 600 PRC trade missions were sent to the ROK, a 100% increase 
from the 1989 numbers. 1I8 Trade offices with consular functions between the ROK and 
the PRC have been established, contradicting earlier PRC claims that no consular relations 
between the two states would be established. 119 
Nonetheless, the PRC still refuses to grant the ROK full diplomatic recognition. 
According to a PRC spokesman, this is due to the PRC's long-standing relations with its 
"only socfalist ally", namely the DPRK. 120 The PRC was the first state to criticize the 
Roh-Gorbachev summit in Moscow. 121 
THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT IN KOREA 
Inter-Korean Dialogue 
Before the 1970s, inter-Korean dialogue had been very limited; this aspect of inter-
Korean relations has since developed further. For example, in the 1980s, the DPRK called 
117 "ROK President No's Bid To Improve Ties Viewed", in FBIS-CHI-90-111, 8 June 
1990. . 
118 "Trade Expansion Continues with South Korea", in FBIS-CHI-90-170, 5 Sept 1990. 
119 "Possible Links With South Korea Denied", in FBIS-CHI-90-082, 27 April 1990. 
120 "Official Rules Out Diplomatic Ties With ROK", in FBIS-CHI-90-035, 21 Jan 1990. 
WHile both superpowers have actively sought relations with both Koreas, the PRC 
. has adopted a "wait and see" attitude towards the issue of ROK-PRC relations. See 
"'Cross Contacts' on Korean Peninsula Viewed", in FBIS-CHI-90-107, 4 June 1990. 
121 "Yang Shangkun Comments on Cambodia, DPRK", in FBIS-CHI-90-113, 12 JUne 
1990. The PRC warned the USSR against cooperating with the ROK in isolating the 
DPRK internationally. See "DPRK, Cambodian Issues in Sino-Soviet Talks", in 
FBIS-CHI-90-117, 18 June 1990. 
41 
for tripartite talks between the two Koreas and the USA.122 The reasons for such calls is 
unclear. However, to the ROK', the DPRK was motivated by three factors: dialogue as a 
way to facilitate the USFK withdrawal; as a stimulus to dissent in the ROK; and as a means 
of helping the DPRK to surmount its economic problems. l23 
What such perceptions indicate is a lack of trust in the DPRK, despite the ROK claim 
that DPRK-ROK dialogue since 1984 has reaped real benefits for the ROK, and that they 
have helped to achieve reunification. 124 Further evidence of the continuing ROK distrust 
in the DPRK can be seen in the recent arrest of 31 ROK students for allegedly forming a 
DPRK-sponsored organization seeking to. overthrow the ROK government. 125 
The Balance of Power in Korea 
Any analysis of the Korean balance of power cannot ignore the issue of US forces in 
Northeast Asia, which remains a significant military power in the region. 126 The USFK 
consists of the 2nd Infantry Division, along with 72 F-16 aircraft, under the aegis of the 
United Nations Command (UNC). The USFJ, with 72 F-15C/D, 48 F-16 aircraft and basing 
facilities for one carrier battle group, can project significant power into the Korean peninsula. 
The deployment of 3 E-3 airborne warning and control systems (AWACS) gives the USA 
a significant early warning facility in the event of another Korean war. These UNC forces 
122 Fuji Kamiya, "Prospects for a New Korean War: Implications for Security in 
Northeast Asia", in The Soviet Far East Military Build-up, pp.173-85. 
123 A White Paper on South-Nonh Dialogue in Korea (hereafter White Paper) (Seoul: 
National Unification Board, 1988), pp.30-4. 
124 Ibid., p.185. 
125 "Seoul claims students form subversive unit", in The Washington Times, 27 Dec 
1990. 
126 The Military Balance 1990-91, p.26. 
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are under the command of the Commander in Chief of the UNC, concurrently the 
Commander of the USFK.127 
The Korean balance of power is characterized as tense but stable. 12& The absence 
of another Korean war since the Armistice ~ be attributed partly to the fact that neither 
superpower wants a resumption of violence. However, that ,has not prevented both Koreas 
from engaging in verbal war against each other. 129 
The Korean military balance may still favour the DPRK (See Table 1), although this 
situation should change in a few years. 130 In any case, the DPRK may only have a 
numerical advantage over the ROK presently. 131 The ROKAF's better training and 
equipment, its access to US military intelligence, and its superior military infrastructure may 
negate any numerical advantage the DPRK may enjoy. 132 In any case, the USFK could be 
. 
127 "United Nations Command and Combined Forces Command in Korea", in Handbook. 
12& Segal,Rethinking the Pacific, pp.206-7. 
129 For instance, in Kim 11 Sung's 1991 New Year message, he accused the ROK and the 
USA of not showing any interest in measures that would enhance the peace and 
stability of Korea. See "Kim I~-Sung's New Year Speech: Domestic Policy and 
Relations with South Korea"" in SWBIFEI0960, 3 Jan 1991. Also see "South's 
Refusal of Nonaggression Pact Viewed", in FBIS-EAS-90-242, 17 Dec 1990, for a 
critique of the ROK stand on the DPRK nonaggression proposal. 
130 Oh Kwan-chi, "The Military Balance on the Korean Peninsula", in The Korean 
Journal of Defense Analysis, Summer 1990, Vol.Il, No.1, pp.9S-109. 
131 It has been alleged that a large number of the DPRK's 1 million men under military 
service are deployed in civilian construction roles, and have, as such, no real military 
significance. See "DPRK Military Leadership, Tactics Examined", in FBIS-EAS-91-
OOS, 8 Jan 1991. 
132 Stephen Goose, "The Military Situation on the Korean Peninsula", in John Sullivan 
and Roberta F~ss(eds.), Two Koreas - One Future?Lanham: University Press of 
America, Inc., 1987), pp.SS-8S. Also see Kihl Young Whan, "Korean Peninsula", 
p.141; and Kirby, op.cit., pp.1S-17. The advantage that good training has over mere 
numbers was well demonstrated by the recent war in Kuwait. 
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TABLE 1 
BALANCE OF MILITARY POWER, 1981-1990 
---
--_ ._---
--
1985-1986 1986-1987 1987-1988 
DESCRIPTION DPRK ROK DPRK ROK DPRK ROK 
ARMY: ACTIVE/RESERVE('OOO) 7501500 520/1400 7501500 520/1400 7501500 542/1400 
ARMOUR 3425 1200 3275 1300 2900 1300 
NAVY: MAJOR COMBATANTS 54 36 59 31 63 38 
AMPHIBIOUS 120 32 128 27 135 46 
I 
AIR FORCE: COMBAT AIRCRAFT 800 451 854 462 840 476 
TRANSPORT 272 34 272 34 242 34 
1988-1989 1989-1990 1990-1991 
DESCRIPTION DPRK ROK DPRK ROK DPRK ROK 
ARMY: ACTIVE/RESERVE('ooO) 7501500 542/- 9301500 5501- 1000/500 6501-
ARMOUR 3000 15{)() 3550 1560 4150 1550 
NAVY: MAJOR COMBATANTS 57 43 58 42 54 52 
AMPHIBIOUS 126 52 126 52 126- 52 
AIR FORCE: COMBAT AIRCRAFT 800 473 650 447 716 469 
TRANSPORT 272 39 280 37 280 33 
-
=:Ii ... .-. i. , , - • - -
, 
. - _ i . }C ~ - , _ . 4' ~ lXXPX> 1 XXX X::I as i ry ( g ), 
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involved in a DPRK invasion of the ROKI33, although a nuclear response IS never 
automatic. 134 
The possibility of a USFK nuclear response to a DPRK invasion of the ROK has been 
a particularly vexing point for the DPRK. , The DPRK has demanded a legal guarantee from 
the USA against a US nuclear attack on the former befo~e it will sign the Safeguards 
Agreement. 135 The DPRK has also demanded simultaneous inspection of nuclear facilities 
in both Koreas.136 It now seems clear that the USA will withdraw all its nuclear weapons 
from the ROK137, but the DPRK has not indicated that it will sign the Safeguards 
Agreement. 
The fact remains that the ROK's annual military budget has outstripped the DPRK's 
for the last decade. (See Table 2) The ROK's military budget has also been consistently less 
as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) than the DPRK's. A comparison of the 
133 Bae Myong-oh, "Prospects of Inter-Korean Military Relations", in Korea Observer, 
Spring 1989, Vol.XX, No.1, pp.25-6. 
134 Kim Seung-hwan, "Prospects for Korean Security", in Stephen P. Gibert(ed.), 
Security in Nonheast Asia: Approaching the Pacific Century (Boulder and London: 
Westview Press, 1988), -p.91. Article 3 of the USA-ROK security treaty, and the 
War Powers Act, stipulates that the US government has to seek Congressional 
approval before the USFK can be deployed against invading KP A forces. See 
Edward A. Olsen, "How Pyongyang Might Think It Could Win The Next Round In 
Korea", in Korea and World Affairs, Winter 1982, Vo1.6, No.4, pp.598-9. 
135 "Pyongyang Statement on Nuclear Safeguard Accord", in FBIS-EAS-90-222, 16 Nov 
1990. Also see "Japan and North Korea 'still far apart' at end of normalization 
talks", in SWBIFEI0985, 1 Feb 1991. Such demands, despite the point that a nuclear 
response from the USA not being guaranteed in the first place may indicate that the 
DPRK does not intend to sign the Safeguards Afreement at all. 
136 "North Wants Inspection of U.S. Nuclear Forces", in FBIS-EAS-90-223 , 19 Nov 
1990. 
137 See "US 'to remove all N-weapons from S.Korea", in ST, 20 Oct 1991. 
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TABLE 2 
MILITARY EXPENDITURE OF THE TWO KOREAS 
1988 prices(US$million) % of GDP 
DPRK ROK DPRK ROK 
1980 1279 4924 10.4 5.1 
1981 1400 5103 10.7 5.9 
1982 1508 5318 11.5 6.0 
1983 1642 5535 11.8 5.8 
1984 1776 5675 12.3 5.3 
1985 1830 6135 12.0 , 4.9 
1986 1849 6593 4.9 
1987 1847 7195 4.7 
1988 1797 7865 9.5 4.5 
1989 1888 8030 8.7 4.6 
I II 
Source: Saaget Deger, "World Military Expenditure", in SIPRl Yearbook 1990: World 
Armament and Disarmament (Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 
1990), pp.143-202. 
TABLE 3 
RECENT WEAPONS ACQUISITION PROGRAMMES 
i 
WEAPONS SYSTEM No. REMARKS 
ORDERED 
F-6 1oo(?) 
DPRK MiG-21MF 150(?) 
MiG-2 60 
MiG-29 25 
Su-25 20(?) 
SA-5 SAM 375(?) 
SSN-2 SSM 112(?) 
AA-7 AAM 120(?) 
AA-8 AAM 360(?) 
ROK Type 209/3 submarine 1 additional 2 
Lynx helicopter 12 additional 20(?) 
ST-1802 fire control radar 
Sea Skua 48(?) 
F-16C/D 34 total 196(?) 
F-4E 48 
F/A-18 48 additional 72 
AIM-7E AAM 148(?) 
AIM-9P AAM 500 
BGM-71D TOW 640(?) 
- -
. . - . 
- - -
.. . . . 
- - . ~ ..... .. T 
.. . 
y ana Herbert WUit, "The Traae In MajOr LonvenUonat weapo ..... , 
SIPRl Yearbook 1990: World Armament and Disarmament (Stockholm: Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute, 1990), pp.219-316. 
TABLE 4 
COMPARISON OF STATISTICS BETWEEN THE ROK AND THE DPRK, 1989 
UNIT ROK DPRK 
Land area 1()()() km2 99.30 122.10 
Population million 42.30 21.30 
. Workforce million 17.97 9.27 
GNP US$ billion 210.00 21.00 
GNP growth rate % 6.70 2.40 
Military spending US$ billion 9.18 4.49 
Foreign trade: US$ billion 123.84 4.80 
* exports US$ billion 61.40 1.94 
* imports US$ billion 56.80 2.85 
Total foreign debt US$ billion 29.40 7.87 
Electric generation billion kWh 94.40 29.10 
Crude oil imports million tonne 40.40 2.60 I 
i 
Grain production million tonne 7.16 5.48 ! 
Source: Far Eastern Economic Review, 22-Aug 1991 
[. 
latest Korean military balance reveals the ROK's technological edge over the DPRK. 138 
That technological advantage is sset to increase, on account of the ROK's latest weapons 
acquisition programmes. 139(See Table 3) 
The shifting military balance of power is underscored by the economic balance of 
power. In 1988, according to some estimates, the DPRK's gr~ss national product (GNP) and 
per capita GNP stood at US$20.6 billion and US$980 respectively; by comparison, the 
ROK's 1988 GNP and per capita GNP were US$169.2 billion and US$4040 respectively. 140 
The USSR has said that the DPRK's per capita GNP is US$400 instead. 141 Military 
expenditure as a percentage of GNP for -the DPRK and the ROK stood at 21.5% and 4.6% 
respectively.142 The ROK's GNP is expected to increase at an annual rate of about 7.1 % 
for the next five years. 143 Table 4 provides alternative estimates of the economic and 
demographic figures of the two Koreas. 
In terms of the Korean balance of military power, the DPRK has to continue existing 
138 See The Military Balance 1990-91, pp .166-9 . 
139 For instance, the ROK was planning to purchase F/A-18 Hornet aircraft. See 
William D. Hartung, "U.S.-Korean Jet Deal Boosts Arms Trade", in Ihe Bulletin of 
Atomic Scientists, Nov 1990, Vo1.46, No.9, pp.18-24. Also see Machmud Benjamin, 
"South Korea's Aerospace Industry", in Asian Defence Journal, Dec 1990, pp.80-4. 
This has since then been changed to F-16 aircraft, which the ROK will manufacture 
under license. See "Deal with US will allow S.Korea to build F-16s", in ST, 10 July 
1991. 
140 "N.K. registers 3% GNP growth last year: NUB", in The Korea Herald, 10 Sept 
1989. 
141 "Soviet Expert Says DPRK Economy 'Shrank''', in FBIS-EAS-90-242, 17 Dec 1990. 
142 "Two Koreas' Economic Indexes Compared", in FBIS-EAS-90-153 , 8 Aug 1990. 
Also see Andrew Mack, "Why Pyongyang nuclear programme is causing concern" , 
in APDR, Nov 1990, pp.16-17. 
143 "Growth of 7.1 % seen for Korea in 1991-96", in Asian Wall Street Journal, 14 Jan 
1991. 
48 
levels of defense spending to maintain its numerical superiority over the ROKAF. However, 
it is unlikely that this situation can be maintained indefinitely.l44 This presents two possible 
developments. On the one hand, the DPRK could become increasingly preoccupied with 
internal economic reform. 145 On the other hand, the DPRK never renounced its aim of 
reunifying Korea under its aegis, and nuclear weapons could be a cost-effective way for the 
DPRK to realize this objective. 146 However, nuclear weapons could backfire, as will be 
discussed in chapter four. 
However, it has to remembered that the issue of economic power can be overstated. 
The ROK economy may have been growing at a spectacular rate over the 1980s, but the 
ROK economy remains vulnerable, precisely because of its dependence on free trade and the 
state of the world economy. 147 The ROK economy now has to grapple with problems 
relating to its growing current accounts deficit. 148 The ROK is now faced with slower 
economic growth and ever-increasing balance of payments deficits.149 
144 Kim Seung-hwan, op.cit., pp.87-8. 
145 Shinn Rinn-Sup, op.cit., p.414. 
146 The DPRK could have calculated nuclear weapons could be used to blackmail on the 
ROK. In other words, in this scenario, the DPRK would present the ROK with two 
options - accept DPRK control, or face nuclear annihilation. 
147 Lee Min Yong, "The Feasibility of the Arms Control Discussion in the Korean 
Peninsula", in Korea Observer, Spring 1990, Vo1.XXI, No.1 , pp.107-33. Also see 
"Reshuffle as Korea grapples with economic imbalances", in The Australian, 26 Feb 
1991. 
148 See, for instance, "Korea's Payments Gap Narrowed Last Month but Rose in 9 
Months", in Asian Wall Street Journal, 1-2 Nov 1991; and "Trade Deficit In SOuth 
Korea Nearly Tripples", in Asian Wall Street Journal, 4 Nov 1991. 
149 See "Record Deficit Is Predicted for South Korea", in Asian Wall Street Journal, 28 
November 1991; and "South Korea's Economy Slows To 8.1% Growth", in Asian 
Wall Street Journal, 29-30 November 1991. 
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Despite the problems in the ROK economy just discussed, the overall picture that 
emerges is grim, from the DPRK perspective. The Northeast Asian security environment 
appears to be shifting inexorably in the ROK' s favour, particularly as its economic power and 
global influence increases. The DPRK's relations with Japan and the USA have been less 
successful than the ROK's with the USSR and the PRe. 
To some extent, the Northeast Asian security environment remains a zero sum game 
to both Korea.s. This arrangement may be inherently unstable, as further losses may induce 
the DPRK to try to correct the imbalances. However, as this chapter has attempted to 
demonstrate, the element of instability is counteracted by the fact that none of the great 
powers would welcome a resumption of conflict in Korea. The next chapter will discuss the 
impact these fears of the DPRK's nuclear ambitions have had on the security environment, 
particularly the Korean balance of power. 
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THE IMPACT OF UNCERTAINTY ON THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 
OF NORTHEAST ASIA 
In this chapter, the impact of the DPRK's alleged nuclear ambitions on the security 
environment of Northeast Asia will be examined. From the outset, it should be noted that 
the Korean peninsula remains one of the most heavily armed , regions in the world; over one 
million troops face each other over the DMZ. The current situation could possibly be a 
recipe for disaster. 
Shai Feldman has argued that a covert nuclear weapons programme tends to be more 
destabilizing than an overt programme. 1 The transition from a purely conventional military 
capability to a relatively secure retaliatory nuclear weapons capability is particularly 
destabilizing. This argument assumes that because no state's covert nuclear weapons 
programme can be kept absolutely secret, hostile neighbouring states will then be tempted 
to launch a preemptive strike against the first state's nuclear weapons facilities before it gains 
those nuclear weapons it seeks. 2 
A second problem that faces any nuclear-armed state derives from the credibility - or 
lack thereof - of nuclear deterrence. In a crisis situation, the nuclear-armed state is placed 
under great pressure to either utilize its nuclear arsenal or suffer a great loss of credibility. 3 
The nuclear-armed state that fails to use its nuclear weapons, in a crisis that questions the 
very existence of that state, will demonstrate to the state's adversary a lack of political 
1 Shai Feldman, "Managing Nuclear Proliferation", in Limiting Nuclear Proliferation, 
pp.304-6. 
2 Probably the best"example of such an incident is the Israeli attack on Iraq's Osiraq 
nuclear reactor in 1981. 
3 Lawrence Freedman, "Nuclear Strategists", in Peter Paret(ed.), Makers of Modem 
Strategy:jrom ,Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age (princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1986), pp.742-3. 
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resolve. Once the nuclear-armed state realizes such pressures, it may launch a nuclear 
preemptive strike against its adversary in a genuine C:lSIS. Such pressures to launch a 
nuclear preemptive strike increase manifold if the nuclear arsenal is small and vulnerable 
itself to destruction in a preemptive strike by that adversary. 
Such factors would appear to apply to the Korean ~se. If anything, the lack of 
strategic depth in the DPRK would only accentuate this problem, as most of the country is 
within range of the modern combat aircraft in the ROK air force.' However, elements of 
stability would probably be in place. In particular, a nuclear strike at the ROK by the DPRK 
could invite a similar retaliatory strike against the DPRK by the US Navy (USN). It is worth 
reiterating that a USN nuclear retaliatory strike against a conventional DPRK attack is not 
assured. 
In any case, the argument about horizontal nuclear proliferation being inherently 
destabilizing requires more rigorous examination. For it to be destabilizing, several 
preconditions have to be met, of which the most important is that the state that acquires 
nuclear weapons must also acquire the command, control, communications(C3) and delivery 
systems to allow these states to utilize these nuclear weapons. 5 
4 For instance, the F-16C aircraft flown by the ROK air force has a combat range of 
500 nautical miles(about 925 km). See Mark Lambert(ed.), Jane's All the World's 
Aircraft 1990-91 (London: Jane's Publishing Co. Ltd., 1990). Even the older F-5E 
aircraft, also in the ROK air force, has a combat range 570 nautical miles (about 
1056 km). See John WR Taylor(ed.), Jane's All the World's Aircraft 1982-83 
(London: Jane's Publishing Co. Ltd., 1982). 
5 R.N.Rosecrance, "International Stability and Nuclear Diffusion", in R.N. 
Rosecrance(ed.), The Dispersion of Nuclear Weapons: Strategy and Politics (New 
York and London: Columbia University Press), pp.293-314. Other preconditions 
include the widespread dissemination of nuclear weapons technology; states must have 
the political will to acquire and to use these weapons in crisis situations; and the 
superpowers must not act to counteract the horizontal nuclear proliferation. Of these 
preconditions, only one - the widespread dissemination of nuclear weapons technology 
- can be said to exist unambiguously 
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It has been argued that despite the improved superpower relationship, the prospects 
of inter-Korean conflict remain as high as ever, by dint of the continuing Korean arms race.6 
It seems clear that neither superpower would welcome such a development. · Indeed, both 
superpowers have worked to introduce conflict management mechanisms in Korea, to help 
prevent the resumption of inter-Korean violence.? 
IMPACT ON THE GREAT POWERS 
The USSR and the PRC 
A joint USSR-PRC statement issued by their respective foreign ministers in September 
1990 expressed a common desire for peace and stability in Korea. 8 However, both states 
appear to favour the status quo in Korea; an independent DPRK is thus in their interests. 9 
The PRC had declared that it would establish full diplomatic relations with the ROK once 
the USSR had done SO.lO But so far, the PRC and the ROK have agreed only to the 
establishment of trade offices with consular functions in the respective capitals. 
A stable security environment is vital to the long-term economic development of the 
PRC. 11 However, this appears to include a strong and stable DPRK. One variable in the 
6 Paul Beaver, "In the shadows of conflict", in JDW, 5 Jan 1991. 
7 Segal, The Soviet Union and the Pacific, p. 75. 
8 
"Chinese and Soviet Foreign Ministers Conclude Talks", in BR, 17-23 Sept 1990, 
Vo1.33, No.38, pp.8-9. 
9 Clough, Embattled Korea, ch.8. 
10 "Developing Relations With China, USSR Viewed", in FBIS-EAS-90-180, 17 Sept 
1990. 
11 Robert Sutter, "China: Coping with the Evolving Strategic Environment", in Security, 
Strategy and Policy Responses, pp.l10-13. 
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improved DPRK-PRC relationship since the late 1980s has been the shared realization of the 
need to improve economic conditions in the DPRK. 12 
In this light, it does not appear strange that the PRC supports the DPRK's NWFZ 
proposal. The PRC also calls for the removal of all foreign-owned nuclear weapons from 
Korea.13 Thus, the PRC's interest in a strong and stable DPRK does not appear to be in 
e 
a nuclear-armed DPRK. 14 A nuclear-armed DPRK could force the ROK to cross the 
nuclear threshold as well. Such a situation would surely dictate significant increases in the 
military budget. Given the close DPRK-PRC relationship, ROK-PRC trade - should it 
benefit the DPRK - would suffer. Of course, despite the suspicions about the DPRK's 
nuclear ambitions, ROK-PRC trade have yet to suffer. 
At the same time, the DPRK remains important to the PRC's security interests vis-a-
vis the USSR. Despite Sino-Soviet rapprochement, the improved DPRK-PRC relationship, 
at a time when DPRK-USSR ties are suffering, suggests that the DPRK is still regarded by 
the PRC as an important balance against the USSR.15 This interdependent relationship is 
12 "Purpose of Kim Il-song's China Visit Analyzed", in FBIS-EAS-90-178 , 13 Sept 
1990. 
13 "Qian Qichen Urges U.S., USSR Base Removal", in FBIS-CHI-90-039, 27 Feb 1990. 
Also see "Qian Qichen Remarks at Disarmament Conference", in FBIS-CHI-90-040, 
28 Feb 1990. 
14 Given the level of trade between the ROK and the PRC, a nuclear-armed DPRK 
could ultimately work .against the PRC's economic interests. ROK-PRC two-way 
trade for 1990 amounted to US$3.8 billion. So far, in the first 7 months of 1991, 
two-way trade has amounted to over US$3 billion. See "Direct China-Korea links", 
in The Nation, 5 Nov 1991. 
15 At a time of glasnost and perestroika in the USSR, the hard-line DPRK regime 
allowed the PRC to escape total international isolation after the Tienanmen Square 
incidents. This friendly relationship between these two countries is evidenced by Kim 
Il Sung's latest visit to the PRC this year. See "China gives high-level welcome to 
Kim", in ST, 5 Oct 1991. 
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likely to continue, in light of the recent developments in the USSR.16 
However, the DPRK is also strategically placed, in terms of the USSR's security 
interests in Northeast Asia. It remains unlikely that a Sino-Soviet bloc - reminiscent of the 
1950s - will be forged. 17 The PRC will probably still seek to counter potential threats to 
its regional security interests. A DPRK amenable to the PRC's regional security interests 
would be of benefit to the PRC. The fact that the DPRK ~as sought to improve its relations 
with the PRC at this time is also significant. It is unlikely that a nuclear-armed DPRK would 
have much incentive to improve its relations with any state, given its ideological tendencies. 
The strategic relevance of the DPRK to the USSR's regional security interests have 
already been noted. Despite the DPRK's traditional dependence on the USSR for high-
technology weapons systems to offset the ROK's growing technological advantage, the USSR 
never enjoyed much influence over DPRK policy. A nuclear-armed DPRK would be even 
less amenable to Soviet security interests in the region. The USSR thus has every reason in 
a non-nuclear DPRK. As with the PRC, the USSR is also dependent on trade and investment 
from the ROK. For instance, the development of Soviet Siberia is likely to depend .on the 
influx of technology and capital from states like the ROK. 18 A nuclear-armed DPRK is 
likely to threaten ROK-USSR trade and economic cooperation. 19 
Given the existing suspicions about the DPRK's nuclear ambitions, it is all the more 
16 This refers to the failed coup attempt against Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, 
and the subsequent renunciation of Communism and dismantling of the Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union by Gorbachev. 
17 In light of the recent developments in the USSR, this becomes even more unlikely. 
18 This is because the Japanese, the first Asians the USSR approached to help them 
develop Siberian resources, are not interested in Siberia. 
19 The same arguments in the case of the PRC apply here as well. A nuclear arms race 
in Korea would demand a great increase in the ROK's military budget. 
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amazing that ROK-USSR relations have blossomed. It is difficult to establish clear causal 
links between the two developments, but some tenuous remarks can be made. ROK-USSR 
ties may indicate Soviet concern about how a nuclear-armed DPRK could threaten its 
relations with the ROK; or it could mean that the USSR was not involved in the Yongbyon 
and related nuclear facilities. If so, then the question of how the DPRK could acquire 
nuclear weapons remains to be answered. 
The USA and Japan 
US and Japanese security interests in Korea are inter-related. The US commitment 
to the defense of the ROK is essential to the defense of Japan. 20 In other words, US 
security interests in the ROK are linked to its interests in Japan. 
The Northeast Asian security environment is not as volatile as it is often made out to 
be. Since the mid-1970s, elements within the USA have been arguing that the USFK could 
be safely withdrawn without endangering US security interests in the region; such calls were 
predicated on the idea that both the PRC and the USSR always knew that the USA would · 
"meet any North Korean aggression with overwhelming force" .21 This argument could be 
read to mean the extension of the US nuclear umbrella over the ROK. Such calls from 
within the USA for the reduction or withdrawal of the USFK have since then been repeated 
20 Edward A. Olsen, "The Evolution of Japan's Security Options", in Security, Strategy 
and Policy Responses, pp.34-5. 
21 See, for instance, "Statement of Honourable Harold Brown Secretary of Defense 
Before the House International Relations Committee Concerning the Withdrawal of 
U.S. Ground Forces from Korea. 22 February 1978", in Handbook on Korean-U.S. 
Relations: Centennial Edition (hereafter Handbook) (New York: The Asia Society, 
1985), pp.231-4. Also see Ralph N. Clough, Deterrence and Defense in Korea: The 
Role of u.s. Forces Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1976). 
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often.22 
A recent security problem for Japan is precisely the likelihood of a USFK reduction 
or withdrawal. A possible solution to such a problem could be the establishment of an ROK-
Japan mutual security and defense arrangement. Any war in Korea will inevitably involve 
Japan in some form or another. 23 A Korean war will inevi~bly involve Japan one way or 
another. 24 Korea is also a vital link to the security of Japan. However, despite both states 
recognIZIng the subsequent need for defense cooperation, serious obstacles to such 
cooperation nonetheless exist. Anti-Japanese sentiments remain strong in both Koreas, and 
the PRe has expressed reservation about Japan filling the vacuum left in the event of a US 
withdrawal from Northeast Asia. 25 Advances in the DPRK-Japan :r:elationship have occurred 
alongside setbacks in the ROK-Japan relationship. 26 
It should be noted that these attempts by Japan at improving its relations with the 
DPRK are fairly recent, and have been conducted under the cloud of suspicion about the 
DPRK's nuclear ambitions. Several plausible explanations for this exist. Japan could have 
calculated that a DPRK re-integrated into the international community would have less 
22 See, for instance, Stephen P. Goose, ItU. S. Forces in Korea: Assessing a Reduction" , 
in Collective Defense, pp.85-102. 
23 Sheldon W. Simon, "Pacific Rim Reactions to US Military Strategy", in Security, 
Strategy and Policy Responses, pp. 88-9. . 
24 Kim Seung-hwan, op. cit., pp.90-1. Also see Stephen P. Gibert, "The Northeast 
Asian Arena" , in Stephen P.Gibert(ed.), Security in Nonheast Asia: Approaching the 
Pacific Century (Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1988), ch.3. Even if 
Japanese "forces are not directly involved in fighting in Korea, US forces will have 
to operate out of bases in Japan. 
25 "Article Views Japan's Foreign Policy", in FBIS-CHI-90-095, 16 Mar 1990. 
26 "Japan's Developing Relations With North Korea Viewed", in FBIS-EAS-90-178, 13 
Sept 1990. 
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motivation to seek an indigenous nuclear capability.27 This may explain Japan's 
determination to continue negotiations, despite recent setbacks. 28 This has already been 
discussed in the last chapter. At the same time, however , Japan has tried to accommodate 
the ROK's security concerns in the former's dialogue with the DPRK.29 
However, it is possible that Japan does not consider ,it likely that the DPRK would 
either have the nuclear ambitions in the first place or that the DPRK would have the 
prerequisite technological development to manufacture a nuclear weapon. It is also possible 
that Japan does not see a nuclear-armed DPRK as a necessarily destabilizing development in 
the Northeast Asian security environment. The point thus remains - despite the cloud of 
suspicion regarding the DPRK's alleged nuclear ambitions, Japan has not been deterred from 
seeking better relations with the former. 
IMP ACT ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA 
The security environment on the Korean peninsula is shaped by several factors. 
These include the possible nuclearization of the DPRK, the great power interests in Korea, 
developments in inter-Korea relations, and the economic development of the ROK.30 
27 Japan could have calculated that the DPRK would have less reason to upset 
international equilibrium if it were re-integrated into the international system; this 
would give the DPRK a stake in the status quo. 
28 "Third Japan-DPRK preliminary talks in Peking in deadlock", in SWBIFEI0949, 17 
Dec 1990. 
29 "No Tae-u and Kaifu Discuss North Korea in First Summit", in SWBIFEI0967 , 11 
Jan 1991. Japan agreed to the ROK's condition for Japan-DPRK relations, that the 
DPRK first sign the Safeguards Agreement and that the DPRK first open its borders 
to the ROK. 
30 Richard Sim, "Korea's Changing Security Environment", in Michael Leifer(ed.)., The 
Balance of Power in East Asia (London: MacMillan, 1986), pp.l07-16. 
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I mpact on the D PRK 
It should be noted that the DPRK's strategy calls for juche in the reunification of 
Korea. 31 This would be done by undermining the social and political stability of the ROK, 
and by reducing the probability of the USA intervening in another Korean war. The existing 
suspicions about the DPRK's alleged nuclear ambitions has thus been counter-productive. 
The idea of a USA-Japan-ROK security alliance has already been mooted. At the same time, 
the USA plans to reduce the USFK by only 10%. To the USA, the DPRK remains a 
dangerous and reckless state; a precipitous USFK withdrawal would only have dangerous 
consequences for US security interests in Northeast Asia.32 This highlights a key problem 
in the DPRK-USA relationship - the Korean balance of military power. 
However, it has to be remembered that presently, a nuclear imbalance probably 
already exists in Korea. This refers to the tactical nuclear weapons that the USFK deploys 
in the defence of the ROK. It is worth reiterating, however, that a nuclear response by the 
USFK is never guaranteed; this issue will be addressed later in this chapter. 
At the same time, the fact that the DPRK has so far successfully withstood 
tremendous international pressures on it to sign the Safeguards Agreement may have resulted 
in increased prestige for the DPRK. 33 The current situation makes the DPRK appear as a 
country technologically advanced enough to develop and deploy nuclear weapons. The 
resistance the DPRK has shown to the USA in particular, 34 regarding signing the Safeguards 
31 Baek Jong-chun, op.cit., p.315. 
32 Peter Arnold, "Democrats blast plan as cautious", in The Washington Times, 20 April 
1990. 
33 "Article Assesses North's Nuclear Development", in FBIS-EAS-90-174, 7 Sept 1990. 
34 The DPRK has stipulated that its endorsement of the Safeguards Agreement must be 
conditioned by the withdrawal of the USFK. See "DPRK Ambassador Holds News 
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Agreement, may boost the DPRK's standing within Korean nationalist elements. This would 
be true, considering the antipathy towards the issue of foreign forces on Korean soil within 
Korean nationalism. 35 
The USSR's limited influence over the DPRK, despite the latter's economic and 
military dependence on the former,36 has already been noted~ The USSR would have even 
less influence over a nuclear-armed DPRK. Given current trends in the Korean military 
balance, a conventionally-armed DPRK has a better chance on ensuring some degree of 
Soviet influence over the DPRK. This may have motivated the latest Soviet decision to 
suspend arms sales and transfers to the DPRK.37 
It has been argued by PRC observers that despite long-standing problems, inter-
Korean relations are bound to be affected by the prevalent atmosphere in superpower 
relations. 38 However, the sincerity of the DPRK's 1989 proposal to the ROK for high-level 
political and military talks39 may be questioned. The DPRK may have calculated that the 
current suspicions about its nuclear ambitions could give it some degree of leverage over the 
Conference", in FBIS-EAS-90-139, 19 July 1990; and "North Korean Statement on 
Signing Nuclear Safeguards Agreement", in SWBIFEI0925, 19 Nov 1990. 
35 Considering this antipathy, the creation of a Korean NWFZ - based on the withdrawal 
of USFK nuclear forces and the DPRK's subsequent endorsement of the Safeguards 
Agreement - would be seen by such nationalist elements as the result of the DPRK's 
efforts. If the DPRK then succeeded in forcing the total withdrawal of the lTSFK, 
this would only serve to enhance its standing with Korean nationalist elements. 
36 See Sidney Bearman, "Soviet Policy in East Asia", in The Balance of Power in East 
Asia, p.19, for a reiteration of this point. 
37 See "Moscow suspends arms supplies to Pyongyang: Report", in ST, 31 Oct 1991. 
38 "Korean Prime Ministerial Meeting Viewed", in FBIS-CHI-90-129, 3 July 1990. 
39 "Letter from Yon Hyong-muk, Premier of the Administrative Council of North Korea 
to Kang Young-hoon, South Korean Prime Minister, 16 Jan 1989", in Korea and 
World Affairs, Spring 1989, Vol. 13, No.1, pp.191-3. 
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ROK in inter-Korean talks. This perception appears to have some validity. As will be 
discussed later in this chapter, the ROK appears to have made some concessions to the 
DPRK's demands. In 1989, Kim II Sung stated that the cancellation of the 1989 USA-ROK 
'Team Spirit' military exercise would give fresh impetus to inter-Korean dialogue and Korean 
reunification. 4o The ROK did not cancel the 1989 'Team Spirit' exercises, but in 1991, as 
will be discussed in the next chapter, this exercise was scaled down. 
The DPRK-PRC relationship faces several conflicting impulses. On the one hand, 
ROK-ROK trade has outstripped DPRK-PRC trade. The PRC's greater reliance on the ROK 
may have forced the PRC to press the DPRK to be less doctrinaire and rigid on the issue of 
Korean reunification. However, the recently-improved DPRK-PRC relationship, despite the 
DPRK's alleged nuclear ambitions, appears to indicate a PRC perception that a nuclear-
armed DPRK may not have such a disastrous impact on the Northeast Asian security 
environment as feared by the other actors in the region. 
Impact on the ROK 
It would seem that the DPRK's alleged nuclear programme has already had an impact 
on the ROK. The ROK Defense Ministry requested for an 18 % increase in the defense 
budget - amounting to US$11 billion - for 1991 from the Economic Planning Board.41 This , 
indicates an unwillingness in the ROK to surrender its conventional advantage over the 
DPRK. It may then be surmised that the ROK will not allow the DPRK to gain nuclear 
40 See "Kim II-sung's New Year Address 1989, at the Grand Conference Room of 
Kumsusan Assembly Hall, Pyongyang, 1 Jan 1989", in Korea and World Affairs, 
Spring 1989, Vol.l3, No.1, pp.182-3. 
41 "Defense Seeks 18% Increase in Budget", in FBIS-EAS-90-160, 17 Aug 1990. 
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take "measures for national survival" if the DPRK acquires nuclear weapons. 43 
The suspicions about the DPRK's nuclear ambitions has also led to speculation about 
an Israeli-type attack by the ROK against Yongbyon.44 Such an attack, of course, can never 
be ruled out absolutely. Taken by itself, the current suspicions could have already produced 
great instability in Korea. However, the fact that this has not happened indicates the 
influence of other factors of stability in the region. 
In the late 1970s, when the Korean military balance still unambiguously favoured the 
DPRK (see table five), the nuclearization of the ROK was mooted as a means of correcting 
this military imbalance.45 Several factors prevented this from happening: U.S. pressure, 
the fear of a preemptive DPRK attack, and the fear of escalating the Korean arms race to 
unprecedented levels. If conclusive evidence of the DPRK's alleged nuclear ambitions came 
forward, it would be difficult for the ROK to remain a non-nuclear power. 
It is unclear if the DPRK ever considered any of the arguments raised 
43 What this means exactly is unclear. Several option for the ROK can be easily 
identified, though, and these will be examined later in this chapter. 
44 James Cotton, "North Korean Isolation and the Prospects for National Unification", 
in The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Winter 1990, Vol.Il, No.2, p.l64. 
45 Ernest W. Lefever, Nuclear Anns in the Third World: U. S. Policy Dilemma 
(Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1979), ch.5. 
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TABLE 5 
BALANCE OF MILITARY POWER IN KOREA, 1975-1980 
1975-1976 1976-1977 1977-1978 
DESCRIPTION DPRK ROK DPRK ROK DPRK ROK 
ARMY: ACTIVEIRESERVE ('000) 460/250 ' 560/1000 4301 - 520/1000 4301 - 560/1000 
ARMOUR 1130 1000 1350 1340 1950 1380 
NAVY: MAJOR COMBATANTS 26 16 26 16 35 16 
AMPHIBIOUS - 80 - 88 90 91 
AIR FORCE: COMBAT AIRCRAFT 588 216 600 204 630 335 
TRANSPORT 190 44 100 - 225 46 
1978-1979 1979-1980 
DESCRIPTION DPRI( ROI{ DPRK ROK 
ARMY: ACTIVE/RESERVE ('000) 4401 - 560/1000 560/260 520/1100 
ARMOUR 2100 1380 2300 860 
NAVY: MAJOR COMBATANTS 28 18 36 22 
AMPHIBIOUS 90 22 95 22 I -
AIR FORCE: COMBAT AIRCRAFT 655 276 565 254 
TRANSPORT 250 34 251 34 
- -
-
ry ( g ), 
above; what is clear is that neither the USA, Japan nor the ROK con~ider it likely that the 
DPRK would have considered these arguments. However, the DPRK may well be aware of 
the detrimental effects nuclear weapons could have on the security environment of the region. 
The DPRK has stated that its obligation to sign the Safeguards Agreement must be balanced 
by its right to self-defense against the nuclear arsenal of the USFK.46 As pointed out in 
Chapter One, the DPRK has to face the possibility of nuclear attack from the USA 
throughout the Korean War. 
Few studies of this issue have focused on the factors of stability in Korea.47 The 
debate in the ROK has so far focused on the policy options that ROK has, options such as 
preemptive attack against the Yongbyon facilities. However, factors of stability exist. For 
instance, even if the DPRK acquired nuclear weapons, the US commitment to the defense 
of the ROK, the uncertain nature of the US-ROK security treaty notwithstanding, acts as a 
significant deterrent against any state, let alone the DPRK, attacking the ROK. US leaders 
have stated in the past that the USA could use nuclear weapons in the defense of the ROK.48 
The USA-ROK mutual defense treaty of 1953 still remains in force, until both parties agree 
to its termination.49(See Appendix Three) 
Similarly, the political, economic and security interests of the DPRK' s two traditional 
46 "North Korean Delegate Asks Japan to 'Advise' USA on Nuclear Safety Accord", in 
SWBIFEI0985 , 1 Feb 1991. 
47 Andrew Mack has been one notable exception. See Mack, "North Korea and the 
bomb" . 
48 Franklin B. Weinstein and Fuji Kamiya(eds.), The Security of Korea: U.S. and 
Japanese Perspectives on the 1980s (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1980), 
p.108. Also see "Text of Joint Communique Following U.S.-Korean Security 
Consultative Meeting, 31 March 1982", in Handbook, pp.280-2. 
49 The clause in question in Article 5 of the said treaty. 
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sponsors, the USSR and the PRC, would be adversely affected by war in Korea, nuclear or 
conventional. And given the importance of the ROK to the economic modernization efforts 
of these two great powers, neither would welcome the prospect of an ROK -devastated by 
nuclear attack. This interest alone acts as a significant deterrent to a DPRK nuclear attack 
on the ROK. 50 The argument that the DPRK may acquire nuclear weapons to nullify the 
USFK nuclear threat is also flawed. The USFK would only use nuclear weapons in the event 
of a Korean war, and only if the tide of the battle was going against it. For that to happen, 
the DPRK must initiate a war against the ROK. However, the lack of support from the 
USSR and the PRC virtually guarantees that the DPRK cannot support and maintain such a 
war effort. 51 The third deterrent to another Korean war lies in the USFK's probable 
response to any DPRK-initiated military action against the ROK. 
That does not mean that the DPRK-ROK relationship has not been altered by the 
suspicion of the DPRK's nuclear ambitions. However, this writer suggests that the existing 
impact has been purely rhetorical. During OPERATION DESERT STORM, the ROK 
President Roh Tae Woo warned of the possibility of the DPRK using the diverted world 
attention to launch an invasion of the DPRK;52 the DPRK countered with a warning of a 
possible ROK invasion,53 and subsequently raised the combat readiness of the KP A. 54 
50 Despite the strained DPRK-USSR relationship, the DPRK still has to ensure that it 
does not become totally alienated from the USSR. The USSR, after all, had 
supported the DPRK in the past, and it may still want to support the DPRK, given 
some changes in the latter. 
51 Larry A. Niksch, "The Military Balance on the Korean Peninsula", in Korea and 
World Affairs, Summer 1986, Vol.IO, No.2, pp.265-7. 
52 "No Tae-u warns of threat from North", in SWBIFE!0985 , 1 Feb 1991. 
53 "DPRK says South may use Gulf war as cover to attack North" , in SWBIFEI0975 , 
21 Jan 1991. 
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However, the obstacles to such a development have already been outlined. 
Nonetheless, the USA-ROK security alliance seems set to change. Both have already 
agreed to gradually shift command of the UNC to the ROK.55 Despite the ROK's insistence 
that a total US withdrawal from the ROK is impermissible,56 the total withdrawal of the 
USFK now seems inevitable. The USA and the ROK have ~eady agreed to withdraw all 
USFK nuclear weapons from the ROK. 57 What this indicates is the growing ability of the 
ROK to cater to its own security needs and the increasing redundancy of the USFK, further 
exemplified by the Korean fighter programme. 58 At the same time, these developments 
have occurred at a time of suspicions about the DPRK's nuclear ambitions. This indicates 
either a perception of the limited ability of a nuclear-armed DPRK to destabilize the security 
environment than publicly admitted, or limited confidence in the DPRK's ability to acquire 
nuclear weapons in the first place. 
This chapter has attempted to outline the impact of the suspicions of the DPRK's 
54 "North Korean Army orders mobilisation", in S~/FE/I008, 28 Feb 1991. 
55 "First Steps for Armed Forces Operational Control", in FBIS-EAS-90-222, 16 Nov 
1990. The DPRK labelled this as a "petty trick ... to cover ... their (the USA) 
true nature as an aggressor". Also see "NODONG SINMUN Views U.S.-ROK 
Talks", in FBIS-EAS-90-223, 19 Nov 1990. In the event that command of the UNC 
does shift to the ROK, the nuclear forces deployed by the USFK will probably be 
withdrawn. 
56 "Security Consultative Meeting with U.S. Viewed" , in FBIS-EAS-90-224 , 20 Nov 
1990. 
57 "S.Korea will do away with nuclear weapons, Roh declares", in ST, 9 Nov 1991; and 
"Washington, Seoul 'agree to US withdrawal of nuclear arms in S.Korea" , in The 
Sunday Tim,es, 1 0 Nov 1991. 
58 "Minister Confirms Korean Fighter Programme Review" , in FBIS-EAS-90-213 , 2 Nov 
1990. 
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nuclear ambitions on the security environment of Northeast Asia, particularly on the Korean 
peninsula. It has attempted to show that these suspicions have not had the necessarily 
destabilizing impact on the Northeast Asian security environment. In particular, strategic 
stability in Korea has not been necessarily affected adversely. 
Nonetheless, the status quo may contain potential s~s of future instability. Should 
current trends in the Korean military balance continue unabated, the prospect of a militarily 
superior ROK becomes a very real probability. Such a situation is probably anathema to the 
DPRK. This possibility could have prompted the DPRK to seek an equalizer in nuclear 
weapons. That does not necessarily affect the security environment adversely, but it could 
have grave consequences for the prospect of arms control and reunification in Korea. This 
issue will be examined in the next chapter . 
• 
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THE IMPACT OF UNCERTAINTY ON ARMS CONTROL AND 
REUNIFICATION IN KOREA 
In this chapter, the impact of the suspicions of the DPRK's nuclear ambitions on the 
inter-related processes of arms control and reunification in Korea will be examined. Both 
Koreas have stipulated that before progress in reunification is possible, arms control 
measures have to institutionalized first. As such, this chapter will discuss the impact the 
suspicions of the DP~'s nuclear ambitions have had on the arms control process in Korea, 
before moving on to examine its impact on Korean reunification. 
From the perspective of Korean reunification, there has been little progress in inter-
Korean arms control negotiations. This lack of progress can be attributed to two factors: the 
lack of mutual trust in each Korean state, and the different approaches to arms control each 
has adopted. The failure to agree on arms control only serves to reinforce this sense of 
mutual distrust. 
ARMS CONTROL IN KOREA 
It has been argued that arms control between adversaries is possible only if these 
states perceive an interdependence of security needs between them. 1 Arms control is thus 
possible only if these states do not see security as a zero sum game. In the context of Korea, 
neither Korean state can enhance its own security unilaterally without threatening the security 
of the other. However, this perception of security interdependence appears to be absent in 
Korea. In such an environment, it is little wonder that there has been little progress in arms 
Nam Joo-hong, "How Much Is Enough? The Politics of Arms Control in Korea", 
in The Korean Journal of International Studies, Summer 1990, Vol. XXI, No.2, 
p.184. 
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control. 
The ROK Approach to Arms Control 
The ROK approach to arms control reflects the European experience, · in calling for 
confidence-building measures (CBMs) "between the two Koreas before real arms control 
measures can be discussed. 2 In other words, both Koreas need to develop a sense of mutual 
trust before they can achieve arms control agreements. This approach would appear to be 
most applicable to Korea, given the deep-rooted mutual distrust. Indeed, Trevor Findlay has 
argued in support of classic CBMs in Korea as a precursor to Korean arms control 
agreements. 3 However, where CBMs have been utilized in Korea, the effect has more often 
been counterproductive; instead of mutual trust, greater mutual distrust has been the result 
thus far. Part of the problem lies in the fact that the degree of support for CBMs in both 
Koreas remains unclear. While both Korean states officially support CBMs, it will be 
suggested later that actions often belie official policy. 
In any case, the DPRK has argued that CBMs are only auxiliary aspects of arms 
control. 4 As such, the DPRK has never fully accepted the ROK's proposals for CBMs, 
despite some points of similarity in their respective positions.5 However, despite the 
2 "European style Arms Control Viewed for Koreas", in FBIS-EAS-90-169, 30 Aug 
1990. Also see Thomas L. Wilborn, "Arms Control and ROK Relations with the 
DPRK", in The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Winter 1990, Vol. II , No.2, 
pp.134-S. 
3 Trevor Findlay, Asia/Pacific CSBMs: A Prospectus Peace Research Centre Working 
Paper 90, 1990, pp.27-S. 
4 "UN Delegate Speaks on Asia-Pacific Situation", in FBIS-EAS-90-021 , 31 Jan 1990. 
5 The DPRK and the ROK appear to agree on the general principles that should govern 
arms control agreements in Korea. What they differ bver are the instruments of arms 
control. For instance, both Korean states have called for the adoption of a pact of 
non-aggression; however, both attach conditions the other state finds unacceptable. 
Similarly, both Korean states agree on the need to reduce arms levels in Korea; both 
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absence of a favourable DPRK response to the ROK's proposals, the ROK has recently 
decided to initiate unilateral CBMs. For instance, the ROK decided to scale down the 1991 
'Team Spirit' military exercise with the USFK.6 Recently, the ROK revealed an annual 
USFK-ROKAF exercise, called 'Foal Eagle', that had been conducted for the last 20 years.7 
The revelation of this exercise could possibly part of an overall ROK attempt at creating an 
atmosphere conducive to successful DPRK-ROK talks. 
These moves by the ROK may be attempts by the ROK to accommocia!e the DPRK's 
concerns about the issue of USFK-ROKAF military exercises. The DPRK has in the past 
branded the 'Team Spirit' exercises as obstacles to peace and stability in Korea that will 
"poison the atmosphere of dialogue between the North and the South of Korea. fIg However, 
the sincerity of these ROK moves may be questioned. For instance, they could have been 
no more than mere public relations exercises, designed to degrade the international image of 
the DPRK, thereby improving the ROK's international image. 9 
What this discussion illustrates so far is that the arms control process in Korea still 
faces many obstacles. In the first place, the different aims and tactics of the two Korean 
differ over how arms reduction should be achieved. 
6 "Japanese Paper Reports 'Team Spirit' Reduction", in FBIS-EAS-90-171 , 4 Sept 1990. 
Also see "US-Seoul military exercises 'to continue but on a reduced scale''', in ST, 
28 Oct 1991. 
7 See "US and S.Korea plan massive military exercise", in ST, 30 Oct 1991. In the 
past, the conducting of this exercise had often led to increased inter-Korean tensions, 
and DPRK accusations of war-mongering levelled against the US and the ROK. 
g 
"Foreign Ministry Holds Weekly News Briefing", in FBIS-CHI-90-041 , 1 March 
1990. 
9 The ROK could have anticipated the DPRK still posing obstacles to progress in arms 
control and reunification. However, this remains pure speculation. 
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states prevent any success in arms control negotiations. 10 From the ROK perspective, three 
obstacles to arms control agreements remain: 11 the continuing perception of military 
imbalances in the respective military forces, the lack of political and economic' change in the 
DPRK, and the sense of mutual distrust. To exacerbate matters, the political elites in both 
Korean states want to focus public attention on external threats and the corresponding need 
to increase military spending. Under such circumstances, arms control measures would be 
virtuall y impossible to achieve. 12 
The DPRK Approach to Arms Control 
The DPRK approach to Korean arms control focuses primarily on the need for arms 
control and reduction agreements; the DPRK has called for the mutual phased reduction of 
both military forces down to a force level of 100 000 combat personnel on each side. 13 
Because of the differences in both Koreas' respective approaches, as already pointed out, it 
is little wonder that these DPRK proposals have not been well received in the ROK. 
The ROK response to such DPRK calls has been to focus on the disparities in the 
organization of the respective military forces. In particular, the ROK has alleged that, due 
to its particular socio-economic and political organizations, the DPRK is able to mobilize its 
reserve forces much faster than the ROK.14 Hence, the DPRK would still enjoy the military 
advantage, even though both military forces would have 100 000 active combat personnel. 
10 Peter Polomka, "Security Issues on the Korean Peninsula" , in Security and arms 
control in the Pacific, pp.1l8-22. 
11 Lho Kyongsoo, op.cit., pp.189-201. 
12 Segal, The Soviet Union and the Pacific, p.127. 
13 "Yon Hyong-muk's Keynote Speech", in FBIS-EAS-90-173, 6 Sept 1990. 
14 Niksch, Ope cit .. , pp.257-8. 
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The element of distrust has been further enhanced by the suspicions about the DPRK' s 
nuclear ambitions. The ROK perceives the current uncertainty as part of a ploy by the 
DPRK to gain greater leverage over the negotiations on a variety of issues, including Korean 
arms control and reunification. ls But it remains to be seen how the current uncertainty 
could allow the DPRK to gain the advantage in inter-Korean , relations at the moment. This 
would certainly be true as long as the ROK still enjoys the US nuclear umbrella, the existing 
uncertainty of this nuclear umbrella notwithstanding. Even if the US nuclear umbrella was 
not extended over the ROK, the DPRK could never explicitly threaten the ROK with nuclear 
weapons, as this would provide conclusive evidence to the ROK of the DPRK's nuclear 
ambitions. Once this confirmation is received, the ROK would be hard pressed to remain 
a non-nuclear power. The likely result of such a development has already been discussed. 
KOREAN REUNIFICATION 
It has been argued that the post-Armistice trend indicates a movement away from, not 
toward, the reunification of the two Koreas. l6 If that is correct, then the current situation 
does not portend well for Korean reunification. The inability of the two Koreas to agree on 
a methodology of arms control is certainly indicative of that trend. 
Great Power Interests 
The improvements in great power relations may ultimately affect the process of 
Korean reunification. It has been suggested by some commentators that one of the key 
IS "Nuclearization of the Korean Peninsula Urged", in FBIS-EAS-90-181 , 18 Sept 1990. 
16 Donald Stone MacDonald, The Koreans: Contemporary Politics and Society (Boulder 
and London: Westview Press, 1986), p.258. 
74 
.J 
determinants of Korean reunification will be the interests of the great powers. 17 One 
development that appears to have allowed the two Koreas to attempt to open channels of 
communication in the 1970s was superpower detente. 18 The same feature in great power 
relations in the late 1980s appears to have allowed both Korean states to make overtures to 
either superpower, although the ROK has been more successful with the USSR than the 
DPRK with the USA. 
Both Koreas have claimed to be more optimistic about the prospects of reunification. 
Despite the DPRK's unilateral cancellation of inter-Korean talks in 198619, a new element 
of pragmatism appears to have affected that DPRK's approach to reunification.20 Evidence 
of this apparent pragmatism may be found in the DPRK's willingness to engage in schemes 
of cultural and economic cooperation and exchange. 21 In an apparent attempt to address the 
DPRK's concerns, the ROK decided to scale down the 1991 'Team Spirit' exercise.22 
Initially, the USA planned to deploy 50 000 troops for this exercise23 , overall manpower 
17 Ibid., p.262. Also see LyOll Byung-Hwa, Peace and Unification in Korea and 
International Law Occasional Paper 2 (Baltimore: University of Maryland School of 
Law, 1986), ch.3. 
18 Kim Ilpyong J., "The Major Powers and the Korean Triangle", in Two Koreas - One 
Future?, pp.120-1. 
19 This was due ostensibly to the 1986 'Team Spirit' exercise. 
20 Kwak Tae-Hwan, "North Korean and South Korea: Toward Peaceful Coexistence" , 
in The Foreign Relations of North Korea, pp.347-52. 
21 Of course, the DPRK's willingness to engage in such schemes are probably also 
influenced by sheer necessity. 
22 "Removing 'Confrontation' Urged", in FBIS-EAS-90-129, 5 July 1990. 
23 "'Provisional Agreement' Reached on 'Team Spirit''', in FBIS-EAS-90-206, 24 Oct 
1990. 
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deployments for this exercise would be reduced by 30 %.24 Eventually, the USA deployed 
18 000 troops for this exercise25 , in an attempt by the USA to be more flexible on this 
lssue. 26 
Nonetheless, the issue of the USFK remains. The DPRK has argued that the 
continued presence of the USFK will obstruct all reunification efforts.27 In light of this, 
the reunification of Korea appears unlikely in the near future, as it is unlikely that the USFK 
will be withdrawn from the ROK per se. 28 This is despite the absence of clearcut ROK 
support for the USFK.29 At the same time, the Korean status quo is acceptable to the 
USA30, as it is to the USSR and the PRC. 
From the Soviet perspective, a foothold in the Korean peninsula appears to be in their 
security interests; as such, a reunified Korea is unlikely to be in their interests. 31 At the 
same time, the USSR recognizes that the ROK's economic success makes reunification under 
the DPRK increasingly unlikely. However, the USSR has encouraged inter-Korean economic 
24 "Official Cited on Size of Team Spirit Exercise", in FBIS-EAS-90-246, 21 Dec 1990. 
25 "South Korea says Team Spirit is the smallest ever", in SlVBIFEll008, 28 Feb 1991. 
26 "U.S. Envoy Urges North To Help Lower Tensions", in FBIS-EAS-90-247, 24 Dec 
1990. 
27 "Daily Urges Withdrawing US Troops from ROK", in FBIS-EAS-90-129, 5 July 
1990. 
28 The withdrawal of the USFK must be distinguished from two related events - the 
planned withdrawal of USFK nuclear weapons, and the handing over of command of 
the UNC to the ROK. 
29 Kihl Young Whan, "Reexamining the United States Security Role in Korea", p.51. 
30 Lyou Byung-Rwa, op.cit., pp.112-9. 
31 Joseph M.Ra and Linda Beth Jensen, "Soviet Policy Toward North Korea", in The 
Foreign Relations of Nonh Korea, pp.139-67. 
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cooperation through third countries. 32 Does this indicate an increasing Soviet willingness 
the part of the USSR to accept a reunified Korea? It may , although an alternative 
explanation is possible. It now appears that the USSR feels that the DPRK will go the same 
way of the former German Democratic Republic (GDR). In the likely event that the ROK 
eventually assimilates the DPRK after the death of Kim n S~ng, the USSR would thus seek 
to establish as good credentials with the likely political elites in the reunified. Korea as 
possible. 33 This means being seen to encourage Korean reunification. 
The PRC has appeared to be more staunch a supporter of the DPRK. 34 However, 
as reunification on the DPRK's terms is increasingly unlikely, the question is whether or not 
the PRC would accept a Korea under the ROK's aegis. Given the apparently contradictions 
inherent in the PRC's regional interests35 , an answer to this question may not be possible. 
However, an educated guess may be possible. The PRC appears to have decided to step up 
its relations with the ROK. 36 Recently, the PRC, along with the USA, the USSR and 
Japan, expressed increasing concern about the possibility of a nuclear-armed DPRK.37 It 
also appears that the DPRK dropped its call to the ROK for joint United Nations (UN) 
32 "Soviet Scholar Advises North-South Economic Exchanges", in FBIS-EAS-90-176, 
11 Sept 1990. 
33 James Cotton, "Seoul-seeking Gorbachev dumps Pyongyang", in ST, 24 April 1991. 
34 "Commentator Discusses Reunification of Korea", in FBIS-CHI-90-125, 28 June 
1990. 
35 On the one hand, ROK-PRC trade is increasing year after year, and ROK-PRC trade 
now outstrips DPRK-PRC trade. On the other hand, the PRC may still have 
important security interests in the DPRK. 
36 "The pace quickens", in Far Eastern Economic Review (hereafter FEER), 1 Aug 
1991. 
37 "North Korea nuclear fears", in JDW, 25 May 1991. 
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membership only after '\pressure to do so from the PRC.38 These developments indicate, 
albeit tenuously, that PRC support for the DPRK is more . rhetorical than actual. If that is 
true, then the PRC may ultimately accept the reunification of Korea under the ROK's aegis. 
Korean Positions on the Issue of Reunification39 
The DPRK had grounds for optimism at the start of t~e October 1990 round of talks. 
DPRK Premier Yon Hyong-muk's speech at the start of the talks focused on the similarities 
and differences in the two Korean approaches to reunification. He noted that the two Koreas 
had agreed on the need for common underlying principles to govern future discussions, that 
both Koreas recognised that these problems needed to be solved, and that there were 
similarities between specific issues. 4o Significantly, however, Yon also dwelt on the 
differences between the two Koreas over the prioritization of the problems to be addressed, 
including the USFK. The ROK's refusal to accept the DPRK's prioritization of these 
problems received criticism from Yon. 41 
The ROK was more cautious, stating that unless the DPRK showed greater flexibility, 
little progress could be expected.42 In retrospect, it appears clear that neither state was 
willing to be flexible regarding the contentious issues. The ROK refused to accept the 
DPRK's proposal for phased bilateral force reductions, just as the DPRK refused to accept 
38 "Visit by Chinese Premier - Revised position on UN membership", in Keesing's 
Record of World Events, April 1991. 
39 The discussion will be based on the inter-Korean Prime Ministerial-level negotiations 
on reunification. 
40 "'Text' of Yon Hyong-muk's 'Speech''', in FBIS-EAS-90-291, 17 Oct 1990. 
41 "Reportage on 'High-Level Talks' Continues", in FBIS-EAS-90-202, 18 Oct 1990. 
42 "Reportage Covering Premiers' Meeting in Pyongyang", in FBIS-EAS-90-201, 17 Oct 
1990. 
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the ROK's precondition for CBMs fIrst. The DPRK exacerbated this problem by 
approaching Japan for economic aid.43 But despite the disagreements, both Koreas at least 
agreed to another round of negotiations. 
The December round started off with the DPRK claim that it would unveil a new 
package of proposals of "epochal signifIcance".44 This was t~ merge the DPRK's proposed 
Non-aggression pact with the ROK's call for reconciliation, cooperation and non-
aggression.45 To the DPRK, this proposal demonstrated the DPRK's willingness to 
accommodate the ROK's security concerns. More interestingly, the DPRK also stated that 
the security of Korea could no longer be seen exclusively as a zero sum game.46 
However, the ROK had again been pessimistic about the prospect of agreement 
between the two Koreas. 47 Not surprisingly, no agreement, save to hold yet another round 
of talks in February 1991, was reached. 
The DPRK spokesman, Ahn Pyong-suk, had warned that a failure to suspend 'Team 
Spirit' could jeopardize the following round of talks.48 Subsequently, the DPRK suspended 
the fourth round, on the basis that 'Team Spirit' was still going to be conducted, the DPRK's 
earlier protestations notwithstanding; also at issue was the ROK's increased alertness during 
43 The ROK subsequently took the stand that Prime-Ministerial talks were of primarily 
ceremonial value. See "Seoul Takes 'Harder Tone' Toward North", in FBIS-EAS-90-
201, 17 Oct 1990. 
44 "Reportage Covering Third High-Level Talks", in FBIS-EAS-90-238, 11 Dec 1990. 
45 Reportage on 3d 'High-Level' Talks", in FBIS-EAS-90-240, 13 Dec 1990. 
46 Ibid. 
47 "North's Yon Hyong-muk's Agenda Previewed", in FBIS-EAS-90-237, 10 Dec 1990. 
48 "N Spokesman 'Ominous' on Next Round of Talks", in FBIS-EAS-90-241 , 14 Dec 
1990. 
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the recent Gulf War. 49 The DPRK also accused the ROK of engaging in "anti-dialogue, 
anti-peace and anti-reunification commotions". The ROK however, saw the DPRK's 
overtures as part of an overall plan to reunify Korea under the DPRK's aegis. 50 This 
merely reinforces the deep mutual distrust in both Koreas. All this occurred while in Roh 
Tae Woo's 1991 January New Year's message, Roh gave t~e impression that the situation 
in Korea was stabilizing, and maturing, and that a realistic approach to reunification was 
possible. 51 
Problems in the Korean Approaches 
To the ROK, three factors have stalemated inter-Korean negotiations in the early 
1980s. They are: 
a. the diametrically opposed approaches to the issues of peace and reunification; 
b. the unwillingness of either state to accept the security concerns and other interests of 
the other as legitimate; and 
c. the continual harping on the USFK issue by the DPRK.52 . 
The different approaches has been the greatest obstacle to reunification in the past. 53 
However, both appear to have made some progress in trying to accommodate the other's 
interests and concerns. For instance, the DPRK stated recently that it would respond 
49 "North Korea Cancels High-Level North-South Talks", SWBIFEI1000, 19 Feb 1991. 
50 "South Korea Criticizes North for Cancelling Talks", in SWBIFEI1000, 19 Feb 1991. 
51 "President No Tae-u Speaks at News Conference!!, in FBIS-EAS-9-005, 8 Jan 1990. 
52 Kwak Tae-Hwan, "North Korea and South Korea", pp.339-47. 
53 Hideshi Takesada, "Korean Security and Unification in the Detente Era", in The 
Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Summer 1990, Vol.lI, No.1, pp.179-89. Also 
see Kihl Young Whan, Politics and Policies in Divided Korea, ch.8. 
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favourably to even a partial withdrawal of the USFK54; this was a change from its initial 
position that the ,USFK must be withdrawn in toto, as it constitutes a serious obstacle to 
reunification. The DPRK also stated that it would consider the ROK's stand on CBMs in 
formulating its proposals for the next arms control and reunification negotiations. 
Evaluation of Reunification Efforts 
All this presents a mixed picture for Korean reunification, On the one hand, inter-
Korean dialogue, particularly on the issue of reunification, is becoming increasingly 
sophisticated. 55 On the other hand, because there is as yet no arms control agreement, 
prospects for reunification remain dim.56 Proposals for arms control agreements, indeed 
any proposals for inter-Korean cooperation, made by either Korean state appear to be 
designed more as a means of attacking the other than as genuine efforts at seeking a solution 
to the problem of reunification. For example, the ROK perceives a lack of sincerity in the 
DPRK's various calls for talks'. 57 But the ROK also appears to be guilty of such behaviour. 
The ROK's stand is that once the DPRK's policies toward the ROK have been de-
ideologized, the basis of reconciliation and reunification will be solidified.58 
A conflicting signal could possibly be seen in Roh's 7 July 1988 address on this issue 
54 "North Korea promises response if US troops partially withdraw from South Korea" , 
SWBIFEI0705, 6 March 1990. 
55 Yun Hong Chul, "The Uni~cation Dialogue Between The Two Koreas in The 1990s" , 
in Asian Perspective, Fall-Winter 1990, Vol. 14, No.2, pp.79-80. 
56 Wilborn, op. cit., pp.130-2. 
57 White Paper, pp.349-62. Also see "Possible Changes in DPRK Policy Viewed", in 
FBIS-E4S-90-181 , 18 Sept 1990; and "North Korean Premier's speech at high-level 
talks in Seoul", in SWBIFEI0947 , 14 Dec 1990. The ROK perceives that these 
DPRK calls have been timed to coincide with periods of political transition and 
instability in the ROK. 
58 White Paper, pp.371-4. 
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of reunification, which the ROK sees as an amalgamation of the reunification policies of both 
Koreas. 59 To the ROK, it indicates its iI1creasing willingness to accept a unified Korea with 
differing socio-economic and political systems. 60 Inter-Korean cooperation would foster in 
Koreans a shared sense of community, which would act as the basis for eventual Korean 
reunification. In addition, it would mean that the ROK recog,nizes the DPRK's right to seek 
relations with other states. This stand corresponds with the DPRK's Democratic Confederal 
Republic of Koryo (DCRK) proposal, which was first enunciated by Kim II Sung in 1980.61 
However, the ROK has reacted to the DPRK's DCRK proposals with scepticism.62 The 
ROK also argues that unless there is a change in the northern regime, no real success in 
reunification efforts is possible.63 With such a stand, it is little wonder-that there has been 
little progress in reunification efforts. 
At the same time, the ROK's so-called Nordpolitik has been seen by senior ROK 
leaders as a means of isolating the DPRK internationally.64 Officially, the ROK's 
Nordpolitik is to provide the means by which the DPRK can be opened up to the international 
59 Ibid., pp.430-1. 
60 Ibid., pp.383-90. 
61 "Kim II Song on Unification, October 10, 1980", in Hinton, op.cit. It should be 
noted that in his initial enunciation of this policy, Kim II Sung made no explicit 
mention of the so-called "one Korea, two systems" formula that characterized similar 
later pronouncements on reunification by the DPRK leadership. 
62 Shinn Rinn-Sup, "Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo: Motives, Contexts, and 
Implications", in Korea and World Affairs, Winter 1990, Vol.XIV, No.4, pp.626-48 . 
Shinn argues that there are many internal contradictions in the DPRK's DCRK 
proposal. For example, the call to "democratize" the ROK contradicts with the "one 
Korea, two systems" formula. 
63 Suh Dae-Sook, "Changes in North Korea and Inter-Korean Relations" , in Korea and 
World Affairs, Winter 1990, Vol. XIV , No.4, pp.612-17. 
64 Cotton, "Pyongyang Cast Adrift", p.276. Also see Suh Dae-Sook, op.cit., pp.621-5 . . 
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arena. It is also meant to provide for balanced economic development in the Korean 
peninsula, thus creating an atmosphere conducive to eventual reunification. On the issue of 
DPRK-Japan relations, for instance, the ROK's reaction tends to belie its official position on 
the DPRK-s relations with other states, as indicated above; as already pointed out, the ROK 
did not react favourably to this development. To be fair, DP,RK-Japan relations may not be 
in the same category as the DPRK's relations with other states. 65 It is entirely possible that 
the DPRK-Japan relationship is a means for the DPRK to pressurize the ROK. 
The fact thus remains - neither side appears to have a great deal of trust in the other. 
In such an atmosphere, regardless of how sincere either Korean state may be, any effort 
toward reunification is almost definitely bound to fai1. 66 Both Koreas' objectives regarding 
reunification remain opposed. 67 In any case, it would appear that while the ROK desires 
reunification, it "sees too many benefits from its present separate and protected status. ,,68 
KOREAN PROLIFERATION AND KOREAN REUNIFICATION 
Despite the problem of nuclear proliferation, some progress toward reunification 
65 In particular, the DPRK's relations with other non-regional states may not be the 
same as the DPRK's relations with Japan, which, as this study as tried to illustrate 
so far, plays an important role in the security environment of Korea, particularly the 
security of the ROK. 
66 "Commentary Views Korea's Reunification", in FBIS-EAS-90-146, 30 July 1990. 
The summit between the respective Korean prime ministers was expected to have a 
great impact on inter-Korean relations, provided that both prime ministers could reach 
a common understanding on the problems of distrust and the differing socio-economic 
and political systems. Such understanding has yet to b~ achieved. Also see Zhang 
Jinfang, "A Big Step to Korea's Reunification", in BR, 27 Aug-2 Sept 1990, Vo1.33 , 
No.35. 
67 Koh Byung Chul, "Policy Toward Reunification", in The Foreign Policy of the 
Republic of Korea, pp.69-105. 
68 Segal, Rethinking the Pacific, p.246. 
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appears to have been achieved. For one, the three rounds of Prime Ministerial talks were 
conducted under the cloud of suspicion about the DPRK' s nuclear ambitions. The September 
1990 round of talks produced a military 'hotline' agreement.69 This is an important CBM, 
and has potential in dispelling the deep-rooted distrust between the two Koreas that has posed 
the greatest obstacle so far to reunification efforts. Despite the absence of other concrete 
agreements, the September 1990 round was seen as a good start for high-level reunification 
efforts. 70 
After the October 1990 round of talks, the ROK Prime Minister reported that he got 
the impression that Kim II Sung would welcome a summit between the Korean Presidents. 71 
Before the start of this round, Kim II Sung had stated that the suspension of the 1991 'Team 
Spirit' exercise would be one condition for the continuation of such talks.72 That did not 
happen, but that did not stop the third round of talks, held in December 1990. 
In December 1990, Roh stated that the next few years would be crucial to determining 
the success of reunification efforts.73 The fact that Roh could indicate even some possibility 
of success may be significant. Roh' s USSR visit later that month .was hailed by the ROK 
media as a step that would "advance the day of peace and reunification on the Korean 
peninsula. ,,74 
Despite the failure of the two Koreas to agree on the NAP and the suspension of 1991 
69 "First Day of Talks Summarized", in FBIS-EAS-90-172, 5 Sept 1990. 
70 "Korea's First High-Level Talks" , in BR, 24-30 Sept 1990, Vol.33, No.39, p.1 l. 
71 "Kang Briefs No Tae-u on Inter-Korean Talks", in FBIS-EAS-90-203, 19 Oct 1990. 
72 "Kim II-song Sets Conditions", in FBIS-EAS-90-196, 10 Oct 1990. 
73 "No Tae-u Interviewed on Summit Expectations" , in FBIS-EAS-90-237 , 10 Dec 1990. 
74 "Reportage on President No Tae-u's Moscow Visit" , in FBIS-EAS-90-241, 14 Dec 
1990. 
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'Team Spirit' exercise, the third round of talks ended with an agreement for a fourth round 
of talks, scheduled for February 1991. This round was subsequently postponed. However, 
the ROK Prime Minister Kang Yong-hun had stated in December 1990 that an NAP without 
first building up mutual trust and confidence in both Koreas and without first ending the 
mutual slander and accusation would be pointless.75 That both states could accept the 
differences in their respective approaches may be seen as evidence of some progress at these 
talks. 76 However, the positions of both Koreas on the reunification issue may not be totally 
opposed. n Recently, both agreed to establish joint sub-committees for North-South 
exchange and cooperation, and for military and political affairs. 78 The normalized ROK-
USSR relationship appears to have spurred on efforts by the DPRK to approach the ROK.79 
The interesting point of these recent developments is that the DPRK's alleged nuclear 
ambitions were not mentioned at all. At the October 1990 round of talks, the ROK argued 
that unless the DPRK showed greater flexibility in its approach to the issue of reunification, 
little progress could be expected. 80 But no mention of the DPRK's alleged nuclear 
75 "Further on North, South High-Level Talks", in FBIS-EAS-90-240, 13 Dec 1990. 
76 "Future of N-S High-Level Talks Assessed", in FBIS-EAS-90-242, 17 Dec 1990. 
n "Commentary Endorses North, South Talks", in FBIS-CHI-90-175, 10 Sept 1990. 
For example, even the DPRK was beginning to see the need for CBMs before arms 
control agreements could be arrived at. Secondly, both Koreas, at least in their 
official positions, accept the possibility of having two separate and distinct socio-
economic systems in the same country. See "North Korea's 'New Epochal Proposal' 
at High-Level Talks", in SWBIFEI0946, 13 Dec 1990. 
78 "South Korea Presents its Proposals at High-Level Talks", in SWBIFE!0946, 13 Dec 
1990. 
79 "Tum in North Korean-Soviet Relations Analysed", in FBIS-EAS-90-185 , 24 Sept 
1990. 
80 "Reportage Covering Premiers' Meeting in Pyongyang", in FBIS-EAS-90-201, 17 Oct 
1990. 
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ambitions was made in this round, nor at the Dec"ember 1990 round of talks. 
In the final analysis, however, what is noteworthy about the existing efforts by the 
two Koreas in this issue of reunification is the lack of significant progress made, Korean 
rhetoric notwithstanding. 81 This appears to indicate that reunification, at least while Kim 
II Sung remains in power, is unlikely if not impossible. At the same time, little mention of 
the DPRK's alleged nuclear ambitions has been made. However, it is worth noting that the 
ROK increased its efforts at encouraging inter-Korean dialogue only after 1989. This may 
indicate a concern in the ROK policy-making circles that a nuclear-armed DPRK could exert 
some degree of pressure on the ROK to accept reunification on the DPRK's terms. 
However, it is difficult to see how nuclear weapons could provide the DPRK with the 
leverage in the reunification process. The possible nervousness in the ROK regarding the 
DPRK's alleged nuclear ambitions does not necessarily translate into political leverage for 
the DPRK. While it is true that the ROK appears to have put in greater effort into the 
reunification process, several alternative explanations for this exist. For instance, it could 
have been a propaganda ploy by the ROK for both internal and external consumption. 82 
Alternatively, since Kim II Sung cannot live forever, the ROK could be trying to seize the 
initiative in the reunification process. 
Even if the DPRK were to acquire nuclear weapons, it would be difficult to envisage 
81 This appears to indicate the possibility that rhetoric is for internal consumption. In 
other words, such rhetoric may be to satisfy the great desire, particularly in the ROK 
population, for the reunification of the two Koreas, to give the impression that the 
ROK and DPRK governments are indeed working hard to realize this ambition. 
82 The ROK could have calculated that it would not be likely for the DPRK to accept 
the ROK's various proposals. However, the act of presenting different proposals 
would make the ROK appear to be the party interested in reunification (the good 
guys), while the DPRK would pose as the obstacle (the bad guys). 
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the DPRK deploying these nuclear weapons in the reunification process. The DPRK cannot 
threaten the ROK with nuclear blackmail, without prompting a US response, the uncertainties 
of a US response notwithstanding. An ROK devastated by nuclear attack is antithetical to 
the political, economic and security interests of the USA and Japan. In any case, there 
appears little point in the DPRK inheriting an ROK that became a nuclear wasteland. 
, 
At the same time, what is being suggested in · this chapter is that reunification efforts 
never stood much chance of success in the first place. Certainly, while Kim Il Sung remain~ 
in power, the prospect of Korean reunification remains slim; once Kim n Sung passed from 
the political scene, it may be possible for both Koreas to reunite. That remains in the realm 
of pure speculation. While a nuclear-armed DPRK might pose several problems in the long 
run for Korean reunification, it appears for the moment that the suspicions about the DPRK's 
nuclear ambitions have had little impact on the processes of arms control and reunification. 
But that is only because arms control and reunification remains no more than remote 
possibilities. 
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CONCLUSION 
The preceding four chapters have outlined the security environment in Northeast Asia, 
and discussed the impact of the suspicions about the DPRK's nuclear ambitions on the 
security environment and the inter-related processes of ar~s control and reunification in 
Korea. This chapter will summarize the preceding four chapters, and offer some concluding 
remarks. At the same time, having examined the impact of the suspicions about the DPRK's 
nuclear ambitions on these issues, some remarks can be made on whether or not the DPRK 
would want to acquire nuclear weapons. 
- IMPACT OF A NUCLEAR-CAPABLE DPRK 
The Security Environment on Northeast Asia 
From the outset, it is worth reiterating that horizontal nuclear proliferation will not 
necessarily destabilize the security environment. "The fundamental disturbance of the present 
international system will not automatically occur upon the manufacture of nuclear bombs by 
other countries. ,,1 This can be attributed to factors of stability in the present international 
system. Certainly, in Northeast Asia, these factors can be seen to exist. 
None of the great powers in Northeast Asia would appear to welcome a nuclear-armed 
DPRK. In the first place, the great powers have increasing stakes in the Korean status quo. 
In particular, the four power system surrounding the Korean peninsula has been regarded 
as favourable to maintaining the peace and stability of the region.2 With the prospect of 
greater stability in great power relations, Korea is becoming increasingly important to the 
1 Rosecrance, op.cit., p.312. 
2 Kim Kook-chin, op.cit., p.495. 
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overall peace and stability of the region.3 The great powers also have increasing stakes in 
an economically viable ROK. 
In particular, the USSR and the PRC have to worry about the impact 'of a nuclear-
armed DPRK on the flow of investment from 'the ROK into their respective economies. If 
evidence were to be found implicating either the USSR or th~ PRC in the DPRK's alleged 
nuclear weapons programme, such trade and investment from the ROK into these two great 
powers would surely cease. In any case, once clear evidence of the DPRK's alleged nuclear 
weapons programme becomes available, the ROK may find it hard to resist pressures for 
itself to become a nuclear power, its present non-nuclear declarations notwithstanding.4 
Clearly J such a programme would require a substantial increase in the ROK' s defense budget; 
this could have a further detrimental effect on the ROK's trade with the USSR and the PRC. 
However, damaged trade relations will not necessarily damage the security environment. 
Given the dependence on trade and investment from the ROK, neither the USSR nor the PRC 
would seek to antagonize the ROK in any way. 5 
In any case, a nuclear-armed DPRK, as a result of either Soviet or Chinese aid, 
would almost invariably force the USA and Japan to adopt a more hostile stance vis-a-vis the 
USSR and the PRC. None of the great powers would welcome such a situation, as it would 
probably necessitate another great power arms race. It is unlikely that either the USSR or 
3 Sheldon Simon, "Security and Uncertainty in the North Pacific", in The Korean 
Journal of Defense Analysis, Winter 1990, Vol. II , No.2, p.83. 
4 
"Nuclear-Free South Korea Unlikely to Soften Pyongyang", in Asian Wall Street 
Journal, 11 Nov 1991. 
5 In fact, a nuclear-armed DPRK may ultimately bring the USSR and the PRC closer 
to the ROK. Under existing conditions, both great powers would not want to 
endanger trade and investment from the ROK. A nuclear-armed DPRK may have to 
be openly denounced by the USSR and the PRC, if they are to ensure continued 
investment from the ROK. 
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the PRe can sustain another arms race. And while the USA's ability to sustain another arms 
race must be questioned, the same may not apply - indeed, it does not - to Japan. Japan 
recently decided to bring its defense spending back to the 1 % ceiling. Either situation - a 
nuclear-armed DPRK, or renewed hostilities between the USA, the USSR or the PRe - is 
likely to exert great pressure on Japan to abandon its self-imposed 1 % ceiling on defense 
spending. Worse still, a nuclear-armed DPRK may, however improbable it may seem, 
stimulate the pro-nuclear lobby within Japan. A nuclear-armed Japan is a prospect that 
neither of the other great powers, nor any other Asian state, is likely to accept. 
Having said that, it appears clear that the current suspicions about the DPRK's nuclear 
ambitions have not had the detrimental effect on the security environment as alarmists have 
feared. The alarm that has greeted. the news of the DPRK's suspected nuclear ambitions has 
not been commensurate with the degree to which the security environment has been 
destabilized by this development. This may be attributed to several factors of stability in the 
region; the probable US nuclear umbrella over the ROK, and the probability of a US 
retaliatory strike against the DPRK in the event it attacked the ROK, are the most significant 
factors. 
Even the isolated impact of the suspicions of the DPRK's nuclear ambitions on the 
Korean peninsula may not be as bad as feared. Precisely because of the probable US nuclear 
umbrella over the ROK, a nuclear-armed DPRK would not be able to attack the ROK, 
without incurring unacceptable losses themselves. The US commitment to the defense of the 
ROK appears to be solid, even if the US were to withdraw from the ROK, something the 
PRe has called for. 6 What remains uncertain is whether or not the USA would use nuclear 
6 
"Jiang Urges U.S.A. Out of ROK", in FBIS-CHI-90-051, 15 March 1990. 
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weapons in such a mission. 7 But in any case, there appears to be little point in the DPRK 
utilizing nuclear weapons to reunite the two Koreas under its aegis. 8 This point alone could 
be a significant deterrent to any nuclear ambitions the DPRK may entertain". 
The debate in the ROK regarding the issue at hand has apparently not considered any 
of the arguments raised in this study. However, that does not ,necessarily mean that the ROK 
is completely unaware of the arguments this study has raised. In fact, the ROK's reaction 
to this issue has been more muted, in terms of actual policy, than mere rhetoric would 
suggest. Two possibilities exist out of this situation: that the ROK does not believe that the 
DPRK can, or wants to, acquire nuclear weapons; or, that a nuclear-armed DPRK is really 
not as destabilizing as the rhetoric as made it out to be. In the meanwhile, the ROK 
continues its Nordpolitik strategy of isolating the DPRK internationally, and giving the 
DPRK's traditional allies a stake in the economic and political viability of the ROK. But 
why would the ROK then rely on such alarmist rhetoric? Would not such strategy only serve 
to alienate the two Koreas even further, reducing already remote chances of reunification? 
Is it not possible that such a strategy could backfire? 
The exploration of these questions is really out of the purview of this study. 
Nonetheless, it may be fruitful to deviate from the intended focus of the study, and consider 
some of the possible answers. The alarmist rhetoric drummed up by the ROK could be a 
calculated act to ensure continued US and Japanese support; this could possibly result in 
better trading and economic investment and aid terms from these two great powers. 
7 The point, made earlier, is that a US nuclear response to a conventional DPRK attack 
against the ROK is not guaranteed. 
8 After ali, the DPRK would inherit a nuclear wasteland. And considering that a large 
proportion of the ROK's industries are located in Seoul, a nuclear attack against Seoul 
would then destroy a large proportion of the ROK's economic strength. 
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Secondly, the alarmist rhetoric could serve to further isolate the DPRK internationally; this 
would have disastrous consequences on an already weak DPRK economy. The ROK could 
calculate that such trends only result in an ever-increasing pressure on the DPRK to accept 
the ROK's terms for reunification . . 
Thirdly, it is possible that the ROK Nordpolitik strat~gy could backfire. 9 However, 
by providing the USSR and the PRC with stakes in the future economic and political viability 
of itself, the ROK seeks to ensure that both great powers would exert enough pressure on the 
DPRK, to prevent the latter from rash acts against the ROK. · In other words, the DPRK 
would have to think twice before launching another invasion against the ROK. 
It is also possible that the DPRK could, in the current situation, withdraw further into 
isolationism. 10 To be sure, that has yet to happen. However, should the DPRK really 
withdraw into its shell further, this can only have a damaging effect on prospects for Korean 
reunification. The political and economic gulf between the two Koreas would only increase 
even further. 
Korean Arms Control and Reunification 
Before any discussion of this issue can resume, one question needs to be posed at this 
point. How likely was success in arms control negotiations and reunification in the first 
place? At the start of the December 1990 round of Prime Ministerial talks, delegates from 
both Koreas expressed pessimism about the prospects of success. ll The examination of 
these inter-related processes in Chapter Four indicates that negotiations on arms control and 
9 International isolation could induce a greater sense of desperation and recklessness in 
the DPRK; this would induce it to act with even less responsibility and restraint than 
it has in the past. 
10 "YONHAP Details Outlook for 1991", FBIS-EAS-90-251, 31 Dec 1990. 
11 "North-South High-Level Talks Convene in Seoul", in SWBIFEI0945, 12 Dec 1990. 
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reunification were apparently conducted with little expectation of progress. Both Korean 
states have not deviated much from their original demands on the key issues. Rather, each 
side apparently seeks reunification on its own terms alone, at the expense of the other's. 
This has led to accusations form the DPRK, for instance, that the ROK seeks to perpetuate 
the division of Korea. 12 
The same comment applies to the arms control process in Korea. The various arms 
control proposals of either Korean state do not apparently take into consideration the security 
concerns of the other. In such negotiating conditions, it is little wonder that no real success 
has been recorded in this aspect of inter-Korean relations. 
In the case of the ROK, while it has attempted to conduct dialogue with the DPRK, 
it has also continued its apparent Nordpolitik policy of isolating the DPRK internationally. 
As such, the ROK continued its efforts at improving its relations with the USSR and the 
PRC. The DPRK made strenuous efforts to ensure that the ROK-PRC relationship never 
progressed to the same point as ROK-USSR relations. In 1989 and 1990, despite the 
suspicions of the DPRK's nuclear ambitions, the two Koreas negotiated over a series of 
issues, albeit without much success.13 In such conditions where the likelihood of success 
was already slim, the impact of these suspicions has been minimal. 
But to depict inter-Korean arms control and reunification negotiations as utter failures 
may not be entirely accurate. Minor progress has been achieved; these achievements have 
been discussed in Chapter Four. For example, both Korean premiers have visited the 
respective capital cities. In addition, the ROK decision to scale down successive 'Team 
12 "'Nodong Sinmun' accuses south of 'pursuing division' despite talks", In 
SWBIFEI0946 , 13 Dec 1990. 
13 These issues included arms control in Korea and reunification of the two Koreas. 
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Spirit' exercises may be an attempt to address the DPRK's genuine security concerns. Both 
Koreas were apparently near an agreement on cultural exchange and open DPRK-ROK 
borders. Such achievements occurred against the backdrop of the possible nuclearization of 
the DPRK. 
To be sure, the ROK could have calculated that a nuclear-armed DPRK could be very 
destabilizing; its attempt to improve its relations with the DPRK could be to dissuade the 
DPRK from its alleged nuclear ambitions. This argument suffers from one major failing: 
the ROK would be surrendering the initiative to the DPRK. And there is little is Korean 
history to suggest that the ROK would ever want to do that. 
An alternative response, though it has not so far accepted, would be for the ROK to 
renounce its endorsement of the NPT, and openly declare its nuclear ambitions. The ROK 
has long been suspected of having great incentives to acquire an indigenous nuclear 
capability. And given the size of the ROK's existing nuclear energy programme, it could 
quickly outstrip the DPRK's own capability. The impact of such a development on the USA-
ROK relationship would have to be carefully studied by the ROK. It remains outside the 
scope of this study to look into this issue; but suffice it to say that while the USA would not 
welcome a nuclear-armed ROK warmly, it would not necessarily conflict with US interests 
in Northeast Asia. 14 
Such considerations would probably not escape the DPRK's attention. The prospect 
of a nuclear-armed ROK alone would be a significant deterrent against any nuclear ambitions 
the DPRK may have. In other words, if the DPRK does plan to acquire nuclear weapons , 
it seems clear that any advantage the DPRK would enjoy from its nuclear status would be 
14 This is providing that the ROK remained within the ambit of the USA-ROK security 
treaty. 
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short-lived. In the long term, the DPRK stands to lose more than to gain by engaging in 
horizontal nuclear proliferation. 
What this study indicates is that a nuclear-armed DPRK is unlikely to destabilize the 
region much. That alone suggests that the DPRK may not necessarily have any nuclear 
ambitions. The destabilization of Northeast Asia by a nuclear-armed DPRK, as postulated 
by the great powers and the ROK, are still purely specUlative. Firstly, it is not immediately 
obvious that the DPRK has, or plans to acquire, nuclear weapons. Secondly, if a nuclear-
armed DPRK is as destabilizing as it is claimed by these states, then these states would 
surely act to counter such destabilization. In other words, these states would act to correct 
the strategic equilibrium of the region. Any conclusive evidence of the DPRK's nuclear 
ambitions would thus be greeted with much less concern than the official rhetoric would 
probably reflect. In other words, the acquisition of a nuclear weapon is not a necessarily 
destabilizing development; for that to occur, a complex web of inter-related factors must first 
be in place. 
The point is that the ROK will not necessarily react to the nuclearization of the DPRK 
in a knee-jerk fashion. The current situation of uncertainty is far less destabilizing for the 
Northeast Asian security environment than official rhetoric has depicted. In any case, one 
must treat official rhetoric from either Korea about the other with some caution. The 
security paradigm in Korea being perceived as a zero sum game, either Korea would tend 
to overstate the threat posed by the other. The same situation could apply here. 
The inability of a nuclear-armed DPRK to destabilize the region itself is a powerful 
deterrent to any nuclear ambitions the DPRK may actually have. Instead, it would seem that 
the DPRK has sought to utilize the uncertainty of the status quo to try to win for itself the 
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upper hand in inter-Korean relations. This may explain the DPRK's tendency to make 
contradictory statements about its nuclear ambitions. To some extent, as Chapter Four as 
tried to show, this appears to have worked. 
However, the ROK concessions to the DPRK clearly do not far enough to assuage the 
DPRK's security concerns. It has already been pointed out that the ROKAF is seen as 
capable of deterring any conventional KP A attack. The need for the ROK to still depend on 
the USA may be a purely psychological hangover from the Korean War. As the ROK 
economy continues to grow, and as the ROK's technological base solidifies, this 
psychological hangover may dissipate. 
In the final analysis, however, it appears unlikely that reunification can occur, at least 
not while Kim Il Sung remains in power. What happens after Kim n Sung passes from the 
political scene is purely .speculative; the scope of this study did not allow such speculation. 
The current unstable adversarial relationship between the two Koreas may be the likeliest 
source of future instability, but so far, another Korean War has not occurred. This has been 
due, in large part, to the desire of the great powers to avoid conflict in the region. That 
remains the greatest obstacle to nuclear proliferation in the Korean peninsula. 
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SOVIET-NORTH KOREAN TREATY OF ALLIANCE, 
JULY 6, 1961 1 
APPENDIX 1 
The Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the Presidium of the DPRK Supreme 
People's Assembly, striving to develop and strengthen the friendly relations between the 
Soviet Union and the DPRK, relations based on principles of socialist inter-nationalism; 
wishing to contribute to the maintenance and consolidation of peace and security in the Far 
East and throughout the whole world in accordance with the aims and principles of the 
United Nations; fully determined to render assistance and support to each other in case of 
an armed attack by some state or a coalition of states on one of the contracting parties; 
certain that the strengthening of friendship, neighbourliness, and cooperation between the 
Soviet Union and the DPRK meets the vital interests of the peoples of both states and will 
in the best way help their future economic and cultural development, have resolved to 
conclude this treaty, and have appointed as their plenipotentiaries: 
The Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet - Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev, chairman of 
the USSR Council of Ministers; 
The Presidium of the DPRK Supreme People's Assembly - Kim II-song, chairman of the 
DPRK Council of Ministers. 
Both plenipotentiaries, after exchanging their credentials, which were found to be in due 
form and full order, agreed on the following: 
Article 1 - The contracting parties declare that they will continue to take actions aimed at 
insuring peace and security in the Far East and throughout the world, and they will make 
their contribution to the cause of the accomplishment of these lofty tasks. 
In case one of the contracting parties becomes the object of an armed attack by some state 
of coalition of states and thus finds itself in a state of war, the other contracting party will 
immediately render it military and other assistance with all means at its disposal. 
Article 2 - Each of the contracting parties undertakes to conclude no alliance or participate 
in no coalitions or actions or measures directed against the other contracting party. 
Article 3 - The contracting parties will consult each other on all important international issues 
affecting the interests of both states, being guided by an effort to contribute to the 
consolidation of peace and general security. 
Article 4 - Both contracting parties undertake, in the spirit of friendship and cooperation in 
accordance with the principles of equality and mutual respect for state sovereignty , territorial 
integrity, and noninterference in each other's internal affairs, to develop and strengthen 
economic and cultural contacts between the USSR and the DPRK, to render each other all 
Source: Harold C. Hinton, Korea Under New Leadership: The Fifth Republic (New 
York: Praeger Publishers, 1983), pp.255-6. 
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possible assistance, and carry out necessary cooperation in the economic and cultural fields. 
Article 5 - Both contracting parties maintain that the unification of Korea must be carried out 
on a peaceful and democratic basis and that such settlement is in line both with the interests 
of the Korean people and the cause of maintaining peace in the Far East. 
Article 6 - The treaty goes into force on the day of exchange of the instruments of 
ratification, which will take place in Pyongyang~ The treaty remains in force for 10 years. 
If one of the contracting parties does not declare one year before the expiration of this term 
its desire to denounce the treaty, the treaty will continue in 'force for the next 5 years and 
will be prolonged in accordance with this rule. 
Done in Moscow 6 July 1961 in two copies, each in the Russian and Korean languages, with 
both texts equally valid. 
Signed: For the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, N.S.Khrushchev; for the Presidium 
of the DPRK Supreme People's Assembly, Kim Il-song. 
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CHINESE-NORTH KOREAN TREATY OF ALLIANCE, 
JULY 11, 1961 
APPENDIX 2 
The Chairman of the People's Republic of China and the Presidium of the Supreme 
People's Assembly of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, determined in accordance 
with Marxism-Leninism and the principle of proletarian internationalism and on the basis of 
mutual respect for State Sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-
interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and mutual 
assistance and support, to make every effort to further strengthen and develop the fraternal 
relations of friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance between the People's Republic of 
China and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, to jointly guard the security of the 
two peoples, and to safeguard and consolidate the peace of Asia and the world, and deeply 
convinced that the development and the strengthening of the relations of friendship, 
cooperation and mutual assistance between the two countries accord not only with the 
fundamental interests of the two peoples but also with the interests of the peoples allover the 
world, have decided for this purpose to conclude the present treaty and appointed as their 
plenipotentiaries: 
The Chairman of the People's Republic of China: Chou En-lai, Premier of the State 
. Council of the People's Republic of China, 
The Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly of the Democratic People's 
Republic of Korea: Kim II Sung, Premier of the Cabinet of the Democratic People's Republic 
of Korea, 
Who, have examined each other's full powers and found them in good and due form, 
have agreed on the following: 
Article One 
The contracting parties will continue to make every effort to safeguard the peace of 
Asia and the world and the security of all peoples. 
Article Two 
The contracting parties undertake jointly to adopt all measures to prevent aggression 
against either of the contracting parties of any state. In ·the event of one of the contracting 
parties being subjected to the armed attack of any state or several states jointly and thus being 
involved in a state of war, the other contracting party shall immediately render military and 
other assistance by all means at its disposal. 
Article Three 
Neither contracting party shall conclude any alliance directed against the other 
contracting party or take part in any bloc or in any action or measure directed against the 
other contracting party . 
lOa 
Article Four 
The contracting parties will continue to consult with each other on all important 
international questions of common interests to the two countries. 
Article Five 
The contracting parties, on the principles of mutual respect for sovereignty, non-
interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and in the spirit of 
friendly cooperation, will continue to render each other 'every possible economic and 
technical aid in the cause of socialist construction of the two countries and will continue to 
consolidate and develop economic, cultural, and scientific and technical cooperation between 
the two countries. 
Article Six 
The contracting parties hold that the unification of Korea must be realized along 
peaceful and democratic lines and that such a solution accords exactly with the national 
interests of the Korean people and the aim of preserving peace in the Far East. 
Article Seven 
The present treaty is subject to ratification and shall come into force on the day of 
exchange of instruments of ratification, which will take place in Pyongyang. 
The present treaty will remain in force until the contracting parties agree on its 
amendment or termination. 
Done in duplicate in Peking on the 11th day of July, 1961, in the Chinese and Korean 
languages, both texts being equally valid. 
Plenipotentiary of the People's Republic of China 
(signed) Chou En-lai 
Plenipotentiary of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea 
(signed) Kim 11 Sung 
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APPENDIX 3 
U.S.-ROK MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY, OCTOBER 1, 1953 
Signed at Washington October 1, 1953; Ratification advised by the Senate of the United 
States of America, with an understanding, January 26,1941; Ratified by the President of the 
United States of America, subject to the said understanding February 5, 1954; Ratified by 
the Republic of Korea, January 29, 1954; Ratification exchanged in Washington, November 
17, 1954. Proclaimed by the President of the United States of America, December 1, 1954; 
Entered into force November 17, 1954. ' 
The Parties to this Treaty, 
Reaffirming their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments and 
desiring to strengthen the fabric of peace in the Pacific area, 
Desiring to declare publicly and formally their common determination to defend 
themselves against external armed attack so that no potential aggressor could be under the 
illusion that either of them stands alone in the Pacific ares, 
Desiring further to strengthen their efforts for collective defense for the preservation 
of peace and security pending for the development of a more comprehensive and effective 
system of regional security in the Pacific area, 
Have agreed as follows: 
ARTICLE I 
The Parties undertake to settle any international disputes in which they may be 
involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice 
are not endangered and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of 
force in any manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations, or obligations 
assumed by any Party towards the United Nations. 
ARTICLE II 
The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of either of them, the 
political independence or security of either of the Parties is threatened by external armed 
attack. Separately or jointly, by self help and mutual aid, the Parties will maintain and 
develop appropriate means to deter armed attack and will take suitable measures in 
consultation and agreement to implement this Treaty and to further its purposes. 
ARTICLEll 
Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific area on either of the Parties 
in territories now under their respective administrative control, or hereafter recognized by 
one of the Parties as lawfully brought under the administrative control of the other, would 
be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declare that it would act to meet the common 
danger in accordance with its constitutional process. 
10,2 
ARTICLE IV 
The Republic of Korea grants, and the United States of America accepts, the right to 
dispose United States land, air and sea forces in and about the territory of the Republic of 
Korea as determined by mutual agreement. 
ARTICLE V 
The Treaty shall be ratified by the United States of. America and the Republic of 
Korea in accordance with their respective constitutional processes and will come into force 
when the instruments of ratification thereof have been exchanged by them at Washington. 
ARTICLE VI 
This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely. Either Party may terminate i ae 
year after notice has been given to the other Party. 
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